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A “DIGNIFIED LIFE” AND THE RESURGENCE OF 
SOCIAL RIGHTS 
By Thomas M. Antkowiak1* 
ABSTRACT—The international human rights movement and its 
institutions have faced searing criticism that they have abandoned social, 
economic, and cultural rights (“social rights”). While favorable treaties and 
constitutions have proliferated over the last decades, grave poverty, 
inequality, and disease still run rampant across the globe. Many have 
attributed the latest rise of demagogues and terrorist groups to this 
widespread social disenfranchisement. 
The supranational human rights courts have historically avoided social 
rights enforcement due to limited subject-matter jurisdiction. Yet more 
recently the Inter-American Court of Human Rights introduced a conceptual 
breakthrough to assess social rights, which was affirmed by the U.N. Human 
Rights Committee at the end of 2018. These advances reveal a building, 
although controversial, movement among supranational tribunals to hold 
States accountable for ensuring a “dignified life” and various social rights. 
In Parts I and II, this article will examine these international legal 
developments, which primarily involve the integration of social rights into 
the right to life. In Part III, the article will then assess this expansive right-
to-life approach, considering its consensual, suprapositive, and institutional 
aspects. When these three aspects are balanced, a court’s interpretation 
contributes to making its treaty system “justifiable, politically acceptable, 
and effective.” 
The Inter-American Court has recognized that the fundamental right to 
life will never be meaningful and effective without nutrition, water, health 
care, housing, education, and ancestral lands. By establishing that these 
elements are indivisible from life, the Court also justified its expansion of 
remedies to safeguard many individuals and communities at risk. While 
States originally did not draft this “right to a dignified life,” they have 
 
 1* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. I thank Paolo Carozza, Jorge 
Contesse, Bernard Duhaime, Gerald Neuman, Matiangai Sirleaf, and Alejandra Gonza for their valuable 
comments on previous drafts. Also, I appreciate the helpful feedback received during presentations at the 
Notre Dame Law School faculty workshop, the ASIL-Midwest colloquium, and the ASIL Annual 
Meeting panel, “Regional Human Rights Bodies as Instruments of International Law.” 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
2 
permitted it to develop in the Inter-American System, as it aligns with their 
emphasis—at least in principle—on human dignity and respectable living 
conditions. The article concludes that the right to a dignified life, despite 
certain drawbacks examined, is a sensible approach to protect several 
intertwined rights, because it reasonably balances consensual, suprapositive, 
and institutional factors. If the Inter-American Court remains committed to 
its development, the evolving right to a dignified life will become 
increasingly protective, as well as progressively influential for both 
supranational tribunals and national legal institutions. 
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The international human rights movement and its institutions have 
faced searing criticism that they have abandoned social, economic, and 
cultural rights (“social rights”). While relevant treaties, favorable 
constitutions, and human rights attorneys have proliferated over the last 
decades, grave poverty, inequality, and disease still run rampant across the 
globe. Many have attributed the latest rise of demagogues and terrorist 
groups to this widespread social disenfranchisement.2 
 
 2 See, e.g., ROBERT KUTTNER, CAN DEMOCRACY SURVIVE GLOBAL CAPITALISM? (2018); Caleb 
Crain, Is Capitalism a Threat to Democracy?, THE NEW YORKER (May 7, 2018), available at 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/14/is-capitalism-a-threat-to-democracy; Social Charter 
of the Americas, AG/doc.5242/12 rev. 2, art. 1 (Sept. 20, 2012) (“Development with equity strengthens 
and consolidates democracy, since the two are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.”); Eur. Parl. Ass., 
Additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights concerning fundamental social rights, 
3rd Sess., Doc. No. 8357 (1999) (“If democracy is to be firmly rooted in Europe, it is necessary to 
guarantee greater effectiveness and greater enforceability of social rights.”). 
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Historically, the major supranational human rights courts, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, have avoided social rights enforcement due to limited subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Yet more recently the Inter-American Court introduced a 
conceptual breakthrough to assess social rights, which was affirmed by the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee at the end of 2018. These 
advances reveal a building, although controversial, movement among 
supranational tribunals to hold States accountable for ensuring a “dignified 
life” and various social rights. 
In Parts I and II, this article will examine these international legal 
developments, which primarily involve the integration of social rights into 
the right to life. In Part III, the article will then assess this expansive right-
to-life approach through Gerald Neuman’s useful theoretical lens—
considering the approach’s consensual, suprapositive, and institutional 
aspects. When these three aspects are balanced, a court’s interpretation 
contributes to making its treaty system “justifiable, politically acceptable, 
and effective.”3 
With its innovative judgments, the Inter-American Court has 
recognized that the fundamental right to life will never be meaningful and 
effective without nutrition, water, health care, housing, education, and 
ancestral lands. By establishing that these elements are indivisible from life, 
the Court also justified its expansion of remedies to safeguard the lives and 
dignity of many individuals and communities at risk. While States originally 
did not draft this right to a dignified life, they have permitted it to develop in 
the Inter-American System, as it aligns with their emphasis—at least in 
principle—on human dignity and respectable living conditions. The article 
concludes that the right to a dignified life, despite certain drawbacks 
examined, is a sensible approach to protect several intertwined rights, 
because it reasonably balances consensual, suprapositive, and institutional 
factors. If the Inter-American Court remains committed to its development, 
the evolving right to a dignified life will become increasingly protective, as 
well as progressively influential for both supranational tribunals and national 
legal institutions. 
B. Background 
After the Second World War, the adoption of both the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and the Universal Declaration 
 
 3 See Part III, infra. 
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of Human Rights inaugurated a new era for the promotion of human rights.4 
These founding texts recognized civil and political rights, as well as social, 
economic and cultural rights, and placed them all on the same plane: “human 
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief, and freedom from fear and 
want.”5 The various rights were established as universal, equal, and 
indivisible. 
However, in the following years, a world polarized by the Cold War 
divided these rights between two treaties: the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights6 (“ICESCR”), and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights7 (“ICCPR”).8 Nations endorsing a 
capitalist and market-driven economy dismissed many social rights as mere 
goals.9 The two Covenants themselves set out distinct obligations: while 
States can “progressively” achieve social rights, civil and political rights 
must be implemented immediately.10 In international law, social rights have 
not yet recovered from this fall from grace. 
Still, recent decades have seen the adoption of numerous global and 
regional treaties that recognize social rights and develop their content. From 
the United Nations, these include, among others, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child,11 the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities,12 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
 
 4 Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. 
Doc.OEA/Ser.L.V/II.92, doc. 31 rev. 3 (May 2, 1948); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). See generally LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990). 
 5 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 6 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 95–19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [ICESCR]. 
 7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95–20, 6 
I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [ICCPR]. 
 8 See, e.g., Ioana Cismas, The Intersection of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and Civil and 
Political Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES (Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca, and Christophe Golay eds., 
2014) (“[W]hile the West may have been responsible for the partition, it was the East that robbed the 
ICESCR of its expert monitoring and individual communication procedure.”); Vratislav Pechota, The 
Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 32, 42 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (explaining that “the 
atmosphere [for treaty negotiation] was poisoned by the political tensions.”). 
 9 See, e.g., SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 217 (2018) (The 
United States “has consistently rejected economic and social rights.”); Philip Alston, Putting Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights Back on the Agenda of the United States, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
122–35 (William F. Schulz ed., 2008) (describing how US administrations have considered social, 
economic and cultural norms to be “goods” or goals rather than actual rights). 
 10 ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 2(1). 
 11 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 12 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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Indigenous Peoples.13 Key instruments have also been introduced at the 
regional level, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union,14 the Revised European Social Charter,15 the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights,16 the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,17 and the Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human 
Rights of Older Persons.18 
Further, national constitutions around the world have incorporated 
social rights. Rights to education, trade unions, health care, social security, 
child welfare, and environmental protection appear in over half of the 
world’s constitutions.19 In about seventy percent of all constitutions at least 
one social right is designated as justiciable by national courts, and around 
one quarter of constitutions recognize ten or more justiciable social rights.20 
Tribunals in Colombia, India, Kenya, and South Africa, among others, have 
issued trailblazing judgments interpreting these rights.21 
Nevertheless, social rights continue to suffer broad neglect. According 
to Philip Alston, the “great majority of States” fail to implement social rights 
effectively, even if they are featured in constitutional texts.22 Legislators 
often fail to enact these norms into statutes, and many national courts resist 
interpreting the rights, even when they are recognized by law.23 
 
 13 G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 
2007); 46 I.L.M. 1013 (2007). 
 14 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, opened for signature Oct. 2, 2000, 40 
I.L.M. 265 (entered into force Dec. 7, 2000). 
 15 European Social Charter (revised), May 3, 1996, 163 E.T.S. 
 16 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into 
force Oct. 21, 1986). 
 17 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 156 (Nov. 16, 
1999). 
 18 Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons, June 15, 2015, 55 
I.L.M. 989 (entered into force Jan. 11, 2017). 
 19 Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights), Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/31 (Apr. 28, 2016) 
[hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty]. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See, e.g., Constitutional Court of Colombia, decision T-025 of 2004, available in Spanish at 
www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/t-025-04.htm (Colombia); People’s Union for Civil 
Liberties v. Union of India & Others, W.P. No. 196/2001 (India); Ibrahim Sangor Osman and Others v. 
the Hon. Minister of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security and Others (2011) K.L.R. 
(H.C.K.) (Kenya); Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 
46 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 22 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra note 19, ¶ 11. 
 23 Id. ¶ 4. 
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International adjudication of social rights is even more limited. In 2008, 
the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR was adopted; this instrument grants the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights the 
competence to decide complaints alleging violations of Covenant rights.24 
But, over a decade later, there are only 24 States Parties to the Optional 
Protocol, and the Committee has issued very few decisions.25 As for Europe, 
the European Committee of Social Rights interprets the European Social 
Charter, but only 15 nations have conceded jurisdiction to its complaints 
mechanism.26 The Inter-American and African27 human rights systems lack 
comparable bodies that specialize in social rights litigation.28 
International human rights advocates also share blame for the second-
class status of social rights. For decades, the major human rights 
organizations emphasized civil and political rights, “turning a blind eye to 
galloping material inequality.”29 Aryeh Neier—one of the most influential 
figures in the modern rights movement and founder of Human Rights 
Watch30—considered social rights to be “dangerous,” because affording 
 
 24 G.A. Res. 63/117, annex, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (Dec. 10, 2008). 
 25 For ratification information, see Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, U.N. HUMAN 
RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, http://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Dec. 29, 2019).  
 26 See Collective Complaints Procedure, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-
social-charter/collective-complaints-procedure (last visited Dec. 29, 2019). Note that, while many 
Council of Europe States have ratified the European Social Charter or the Revised Social Charter, these 
treaties permit States to recognize only a portion of the enumerated rights. 
 27 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights contains numerous social, economic, and 
cultural rights that can be interpreted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Other relevant instruments in the region include the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, as well 
as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which has its own monitoring mechanism, 
the Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, Org. of African Unity [OAU] AHG/Res. 
240 (XXXI), opened for signature July 11, 2003 (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005). African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Org. of African Unity [OAU] Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, adopted July 
1, 1990 (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999). 
 28 Below the Article discusses how the Inter-American Court adjudicates social rights, in addition to 
civil and political rights. 
 29 MOYN, supra note 9, at 176. See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra 
note 19, ¶ 11 (“This marginality manifests itself . . . in the work of many of the most prominent civil 
society groups focusing on human rights.”); PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR 9–10 (2004) (stating that the “hesitation of many in the human 
rights community” to act on social rights amounts to a “failure . . . to address the urgent needs” of the 
poor.); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
157, 191 (2004) (transitional justice organizations “have often given short shrift to economic, social and 
cultural rights.”). 
 30 Aryeh Neier is president emeritus of the Open Society Foundations. He also served as executive 
director of Human Rights Watch, which he helped found in 1978, and as national executive director of 
the American Civil Liberties Union. 
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them the same importance as civil and political rights “takes an area where 
[political] compromise is essential and brings that into the process of rights 
adjudication.”31 
It is true that a new generation of rights advocates and civil society 
organizations have taken up the mantle of social rights, fusing litigation 
efforts with political engagement.32 Yet despite this building movement, and 
the many favorable treaties and constitutions, clearly not enough has been 
accomplished to protect social rights. In the face of global impoverishment 
and inequality, Alston calls for concerted, deeper efforts to legally recognize 
social rights, to establish “appropriate institutional arrangements” for their 
promotion, and to ensure government accountability when the rights are 
violated.33 
C. Approaches of Supranational Tribunals: Life and Social Rights 
1. The Basics 
The European Court, in operation since 1959, and Inter-American 
Court, issuing merits decisions since 1987, generally enjoy authority and 
prestige in their regions.34 Their binding jurisdiction primarily concerns the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms35 and the American Convention on Human Rights,36 respectively. 
Like the ICCPR, these treaties focus upon civil and political rights, with 
 
 31 Aryeh Neier, Social and Economic Rights: A Critique, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1–2 (2006). 
 32 See, e.g., Elisa Massimino, Letter to the Editor, This Is the New American Human Rights 
Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/29/opinion/human-
rights.html (describing “the new American human rights movement, fueled by activists who understand 
that enforcement of rights—including economic, social and cultural rights—is an inherently political 
fight.”); Caroline Bettinger-López, The Long Arc of Human Rights: A Case for Optimism, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (May-June 2018). Amnesty International has expanded its efforts to protect social rights. See 
AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INT’L ANNUAL REPORT 2018/19, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/6700/2018/en/ (“[T]his year’s report also shines a 
spotlight on economic, social and cultural rights.”); Many Rights, Some Wrong, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 
22, 2007), https://www.economist.com/international/2007/03/22/many-rights-some-wrong (Amnesty’s 
mission has “become broader and more ambitious, calling for . . . economic improvement.”). 
 33 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra note 19, ¶ 21. 
 34 See, e.g., DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE, E.P. BATES, & CARLA BUCKLEY, HARRIS, 
O’BOYLE & WARBRICK: LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 107 (4th ed. 2018) 
[hereinafter HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK]; THOMAS M. ANTKOWIAK & ALEJANDRA GONZA, THE 
AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS (2017) [hereinafter ANTKOWIAK & 
GONZA]. 
 35 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
 36 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter American 
Convention]. 
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select exceptions.37 For its part, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee delivers non-binding, yet influential, interpretations of the 
ICCPR through general comments, observations on state reports, and 
decisions in individual cases.38 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the newest regional 
human rights tribunal, did not hand down its first judgment until the end of 
2009.39 The African Court mainly interprets the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, which, in addition to civil and political rights, 
recognizes individual rights to work, health, education, and cultural life.40 
The African Charter also establishes collective rights, including peoples’ 
rights to self-determination, to “economic, social and cultural development,” 
and to “freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.”41 
2. The United Nations Human Rights Committee 
Since 1982, the Human Rights Committee has stated that the right to 
life “cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner.”42 Mainly in its 
 
 37 For example, the ICCPR’s provisions on self-determination, freedom of thought, freedom of 
association, and minority rights also refer to social, economic and cultural rights. See Martin Scheinin, 
Human Rights Committee: Not Only a Committee on Civil and Political Rights, in SOCIAL RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 540 (Malcolm 
Langford ed., 2008); Craig Scott, Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards 
a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights, 27 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 769, 771 
(1989) (considering the extent to which rights in the ICESCR “permeate” the ICCPR). Further, the 
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms added the 
right to education to the European Convention, among other rights. See Protocol to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, 213 
U.N.T.S. 264 (entered into force May 18, 1954). 
 38 See, e.g., MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR 
COMMENTARY xxvii, 894 (2d ed., 2005) (noting that the Human Rights Committee’s decisions and 
resolutions are authoritative but not binding under international law). 
 39 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established by a protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Organization of African Unity (OAU), Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (entered into force Jan. 25, 2004), available at 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f4b19c14.html. Though the Protocol entered into force in 2004, little 
progress was made, and the first judgment was not issued until 2009. Yogogombaye v. Republic of 
Senegal, Judgment, App. No. 001/2008, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R. (Dec. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/1-2008.pdf. 
 40 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, arts. 15–17 
(Oct. 21, 1986), http://www.humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/African-Charter-on-Human-
and-Peoples-Rights.pdf. 
 41 Id. arts. 20–22. 
 42 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), ¶ 5 (Apr. 30, 
1982), in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), 176–78 (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter General 
Comment 6]; see also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 2348/2014, Toussaint v. Canada, 
¶ 11.3 (views adopted on 24 July 2018) [hereinafter Toussaint v. Canada]. 
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responses to the reports of State Parties, the Committee has interpreted the 
ICCPR’s Article 6, the right to life, to include select socio-economic 
elements.43 In this way, it has directed States to “take positive measures 
required by [A]rticle 6 to address [the] serious problem” of homelessness.44 
The Committee has called on States to provide all detained individuals with 
necessary medical care and to regularly monitor detention conditions.45 It has 
urged States “to eliminate malnutrition” and the spread of disease.46 In 
addition, the Committee has observed that measures which restrict “access 
to all basic and life-saving services such as food, health, electricity, water 
and sanitation” jeopardize Article 6.47 
In an individual case, Toussaint v. Canada, the Committee recently held 
that State obligations to respect and ensure the right to life include 
“reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations that can result 
in loss of life.”48 That is, States can violate Article 6 even if these scenarios 
do not lead to death. Further,  
as a minimum States [P]arties have the obligation to provide access 
to existing health care services that are reasonably available and 
 
 43 To protect social rights, the Human Rights Committee has used other ICCPR provisions as well, 
such as the prohibition on torture and the right to privacy, family and home. See Scheinin, supra note 37, 
at 540. 
 44 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the H.R. Comm., Canada, ¶ 12, U.N. 
Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.105 (Apr. 7 1999). 
 45 Communication No. 763/1997, Lantsov v. Russian Federation, ¶¶ 9.2–11 (views adopted on 26 
March 2002); General Comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, on the right to life, ¶ 25 [hereinafter General Comment 36]. See also Womah Mukong v. 
Cameroon, Communication No. 458/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, ¶ 9.3 (1994) (setting out 
minimum standards for detention conditions). 
 46 General Comment 6, supra note 42, ¶ 5. See also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding 
Observations of the H.R. Comm., Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/72/PRK (Aug. 27, 2001) (“[T]he Committee remains seriously concerned about the lack of 
measures by the State party to deal with the food and nutrition situation.”); U.N. Human Rights Comm., 
Concluding Observations of the H.R. Comm., Moldova, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/75/MDA (July 25, 
2002) (“The State Party should take immediate steps to ensure that the conditions of detention within its 
facilities comply with the standards set out in articles 6, 7 and 10 of the Covenant, including the prevention 
of the spread of disease and the provision of appropriate medical treatment to persons who have 
contracted diseases, either in prison or prior to their detention.”). 
 47 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the fourth periodic report of Israel, ¶  12, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4 (Nov. 21, 2014) (noting with concern that “the blockade [of the Gaza Strip] 
continues to . . . negatively impact [] Palestinians’ access to all basic and life-saving services such as 
food, health, electricity, water and sanitation.”). See also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Comm., Israel, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 (Sept. 3, 2010) 
(“The Committee is concerned at water shortages disproportionately affecting the Palestinian population 
of the West Bank, due to prevention of construction and maintenance of water and sanitation 
infrastructure.”). The Human Rights Committee has also used interim measures to seek reconnection of 
water sources. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Liliana Assenova Naidenova v. Bulgaria, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/106/D/2073/2011 (Nov. 27, 2012). 
 48 Toussaint v. Canada, supra note 42. 
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accessible, when lack of access to the health care would expose a 
person to a reasonably foreseeable risk [of death].49  
However, this decision was uncommon.50 The Committee rarely has 
developed the socio-cultural content of the right to life through its individual 
communications procedure.51 
In October of 2018, building on Toussaint, the Committee expanded the 
boundaries of the right to life. Following three years of consultations and 
drafting,52 the Committee approved General Comment No. 36 on the right to 
life.53 It stated, in part: 
The duty to protect life implies that States [P]arties should take 
appropriate measures to address the general conditions in society 
that may eventually give rise to direct threats to life or prevent 
individuals from enjoying their right to life with dignity. These 
general conditions may include high levels of criminal and gun 
violence, . . . pervasive traffic and industrial accidents, . . . 
degradation of the environment, . . . deprivation of land, territories 
and resources of indigenous peoples, . . . the prevalence of life 
threatening diseases, . . . extensive substance abuse, widespread 
hunger and malnutrition and extreme poverty and homelessness 
(emphasis added).54 
The General Comment then explained that States should address these 
“general conditions” through “measures designed to ensure access without 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Cabal and Pasini v. Australia, ¶ 7.7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001 (Aug. 7 2003) (“The Committee considers that a failure to separate detainees 
with communicable diseases from other detainees could raise issues primarily under articles 6, paragraph 
1, and 10, paragraph 1.”). 
 51 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a 
component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this 
context, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/71/310 (Aug. 8, 2016) (“The Committee’s recognition in its general comment 
No. 6 and in periodic reviews that the right to life requires positive measures to address homelessness and 
poverty stands in marked contrast with the absence of consideration of these obligations in [individual 
communications].”) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing]; Eibe Riedel, 
The Right to Life and the Right to Health, in Particular the Obligation to Reduce Child Mortality, in THE 
RIGHT TO LIFE 351, 354–55 (Christian Tomuschat, Evelyne Lagrange & Stefan Oeter eds., 2010) 
(explaining that the Committee hardly ever deals with “broader” right-to-life issues and positive state 
obligations in its individual cases). 
 52 During the drafting process, numerous States, experts, United Nations institutions, and civil 
society organizations submitted observations. See Call for Comments on Article 6—Right to Life, U.N. 
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GC36-Article6Righttolife.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 
2019). 
 53 General Comment 36, supra note 45. This comment replaced the earlier general comments No. 6 
and No. 14, adopted by the Committee in 1982 and 1984, respectively. Id. ¶ 1. 
 54 Id. ¶ 26. 
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delay by individuals to essential goods and services such as food, water, 
shelter, health-care, electricity and sanitation,” as well as “effective 
emergency health services, emergency response operations . . . and social 
housing programs,” among others.55 Thus, the Human Rights Committee has 
extended State obligations and the substantive content for the right to life, 
“underscoring” the “right to life with dignity.”56 
The international legal precedent for this right, also known as the “right 
to a dignified life,” is the seminal judgment Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala 
from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.57 With the Villagrán 
Morales line of cases, the Inter-American Court expands the right to life 
(Article 4 of the American Convention) to include certain social, economic, 
and cultural rights. As discussed in detail below, the Court has found Article 
4 violations when individuals or communities lacked adequate water, 
nutrition, health care, shelter, or education. 
3. The European Court of Human Rights 
In contrast, the European Court has resisted the expansion of the right 
to life in this way. In fact, the Court has held that “neither Article 2 [the right 
to life] nor any other provision of the [European] Convention can be 
interpreted as conferring on an individual a right to enjoy any given standard 
of living, or a right to obtain financial assistance from the State.”58 There is 
scant case law on whether a State’s failure to provide housing may implicate 
Article 2.59 
Similarly, the European Court has avoided establishing a general right 
of access to health care under Article 2, even when life is at risk.60 The Grand 
Chamber has held that “issues such as the allocation of public funds in the 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Committee adopts General Comment on the right to life 
(Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23797&LangID=E (“The 
General Comment sent a strong message against the narrow legal interpretation of the right to life . . .  
and it underscored the right to life with dignity.”). See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate 
Housing, supra note 51, ¶ 44 (stating that certain components, such as “the right to a dignified life,” could 
“lay the foundation for a renewed commitment to a more expansive approach and the recognition of 
positive obligations.”). Interestingly, a few months earlier the Human Rights Committee mentioned “a 
life with dignity” without expressly naming it a right. Toussaint v. Canada, supra note 42. 
 57 Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 191 
(Nov. 19, 1999). 
 58 Wasilewski v. Poland, App. No. 32734/96, Admissibility, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 3 (1999), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59101. Nevertheless, in Kutepov and Anikeyenko v. Russia, the 
Court left open the possibility that an inadequate pension, if leading to a “real and immediate risk” to an 
individual’s life, could “warrant the application of Article 2.” Kutepov and Anikeyenko v. Russia, App. 
No. 68029/01, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 62 (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70761. 
 59 See HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 34, at 216. 
 60 See id. at 215. 
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area of healthcare are not a matter [for the Court],” choosing to defer to the 
competent national authorities.61 Nevertheless, as established in other human 
rights systems, given the vulnerable situation of individuals in State custody, 
the State has direct responsibility for their “health and physical well-being,” 
and must provide them “with the requisite medical assistance.”62 
Further, the European Court requires States to regulate both public and 
private hospitals in order to protect the lives of patients.63 However, it has 
explained that only in “very exceptional circumstances” will health 
professionals’ acts and omissions lead to a violation of Article 2.64 These 
circumstances include when a patient’s life “is knowingly put in danger by 
denial of access to life-saving emergency treatment.”65 Article 2 will also be 
breached where “a systemic or structural dysfunction in hospital services 
results in a patient being deprived of access to life-saving emergency 
treatment, and the authorities knew or ought to have known about that risk” 
and failed to prevent it.66 Thus, the bar to an Article 2 violation in this context 
is high; yet denial of medical treatment is one of the few situations67 where 
the Court finds social rights to implicate the right to life.68 
 
 61 Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal, App. No. 56080/13, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 175 
(2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-179556. 
 62 Gorelov v. Russia, App. No. 49072/11, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 42 (2014), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-139931. See also Slimani v. France, No. 57671/00, 2004‑IX 
(extracts) Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 27, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61944. 
 63 Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal, App. No. 56080/13, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 166. See 
also Oyal v. Turkey, App. No. 4864/05, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 54 (2010), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-97848. 
 64 Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal, App. No. 56080/13, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 190. 
 65 Id. ¶ 191. The European Court notes that the situation “does not extend to circumstances where a 
patient is considered to have received deficient, incorrect or delayed treatment.” Id. A refusal to release 
a sick prisoner that results in a reduction of his or her life expectancy may raise an issue under Article 2. 
Grice v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22564/93, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R (1994). 
 66 Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal, App. No. 56080/13, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 192. For 
example, in Asiye Genç v. Turkey, a prematurely-born baby died in an ambulance while being transferred 
from one hospital to another. The Court concluded that the State had breached Article 2 for failing to 
adequately provide for and coordinate emergency care and neonatal facilities in the area’s hospitals. Asiye 
Genç v. Turkey, App. No. 24109/07, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 87 (2015), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-151025. In Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 15 young persons died 
during the winter in their state-run facility for disabled youth, because authorities did not furnish sufficient 
medical care, food, and heat. The Court found the State responsible for violating Article 2, due to 
“exceptional circumstances” that took the case beyond a health professional’s mere “error of judgment.” 
The judgment is not available in English; for a summary, see HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra 
note 34, at 215. 
 67 See Liam Thornton, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Socio-Economic Rights 
Charter?, in IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 60 YEARS AND BEYOND 
233 (Egan, Thornton, and Walsh eds., 2014) (explaining that most of the relevant cases under Article 2 
are “within the field of access to medical treatment.”). 
 68 In Öneryildiz v Turkey, several victims died when a methane gas explosion occurred in the garbage 
dump where they lived, resulting in an Article 2 violation. Öneryildiz v Turkey, Grand Chamber, App. 
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4. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
In its 2017 judgment concerning the Ogiek community of Kenya, the 
African Court directly considered the right to a “decent” or dignified life.69 
The Ogiek population had been evicted from their ancestral lands in the Mau 
Forest, and the Court found that Kenya had violated, among others, their 
collective rights to property and to “economic, social and cultural 
development.”70 The community members also argued that their right to life 
had been infringed, as they were “exposed to conditions affecting their 
decent way of life.”71 The Court responded that “the sole fact of eviction and 
deprivation of economic, social and cultural rights may not necessarily result 
in the violation of the right to life” under the African Charter.72 
In this way, the African Court has appeared to reject a broader 
interpretation of the right to life, explaining that the African Charter’s Article 
4 “relates to the physical rather than the existential understanding of the right 
to life.”73 The African Court certainly could have accepted a wider concept 
of the right. As the Ogiek judgment itself recognized, the African Charter 
sets out an expansive formulation for the right, linking the right to life to “the 
inviolable nature and integrity of the human being.”74 Moreover, in similar 
 
No. 48939/99, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R (2004). In view of this judgment, O’Cinneide argues that it would 
involve “no great conceptual leap to suggest that state responsibility may be engaged where individuals 
are exposed to specific and distinct threats to their life as a result of their destitution . . . , where the nature 
and existence of that distinct threat to life should have been known to the authorities” and reasonable 
measures could have been taken to prevent the threat. Colm O’Cinneide, A Modest Proposal: Destitution, 
State Responsibility and the European Convention on Human Rights, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 583, 
583–605 (2008). See also ELIZABETH WICKS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 219 
(2010) (“While [Öneryildiz v Turkey] falls short of imposing a general obligation on state parties to the 
ECHR to protect or guarantee the lives of the poor, it does imply that a specific responsibility may emerge 
in particular circumstances to protect the destitute from perceptible threats to their lives.”). 
 69 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, Judgement, 006/2012, 




 70 Id. ¶ 210. 
 71 Id. ¶ 147. 
 72 Id. ¶ 153. See also Ricarda Roesch, The Ogiek Case of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: Not So Much News After All?, EJIL: TALK! (June 16, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-ogiek-
case-of-the-african-court-on-human-and-peoples-rights-not-so-much-news-after-all/ (“The Ogiek case 
shows that the causality between the eviction of a group and a violation of their right to life can be difficult 
to establish.”). 
 73 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, 006/2012, Afr. 
Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 154. 
 74 Id. ¶ 152 (“Contrary to other human rights instruments, the Charter establishes the link between 
the right to life and the inviolable nature and integrity of the human being. The Court finds that this 
formulation reflects the indispensable correlation between these two rights.”). 
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circumstances, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has 
cited the Inter-American Court’s “right to a dignified life” with approval.75 
5. Section Synthesis 
To some extent, then, the Human Rights Committee has adopted the 
Inter-American Court’s concept of the right to a dignified life.76 Of course, it 
remains to be seen how the Committee further refines and applies this 
interpretation to the ICCPR States Parties.77 Particularly interesting will be 
how the Committee determines precise obligations and entitlements under 
the right to life through the individual communications procedure.78 
In contrast, the African Court seems to have disapproved of this broader 
right to life. However, endorsing this principle was less necessary for social 
rights protection in the African regional system, as the African Charter 
already establishes several social, economic, and cultural rights—of both 
individual and collective nature. For its part, the European Court has also 
shown much caution in integrating social rights into the right to life. 
Nevertheless, there are promising signs that the Court increasingly 
 
 75 See, e.g., Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group 
International (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v. Kenya, Comm. No. 276/2003, Afr. Comm’n 
H.P.R., ¶ 217, (Feb. 4, 2010) (“The IActHR held that one of the obligations that the State must inescapably 
undertake as guarantor to protect and ensure the right to life is that of generating minimum living 
conditions that are compatible with the dignity of the human person . . . . In this regard, the State has the 
duty to take positive, concrete measures geared towards fulfilment of the right to a decent life, especially 
in the case of persons who are vulnerable and at risk, whose care becomes a high priority.”), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2010_africa_commission_ruling_0.pdf; General 
Comment No.3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the right to life (Article 4), Afr. 
Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 3 (Nov. 2015) (“[T]he Charter envisages the protection not only of life in a narrow 
sense, but of dignified life. This requires a broad interpretation of States’ responsibilities to protect 
life . . . .”). 
 76 As closely reviewed below, to date the Inter-American Court has indicated that water, nutrition, 
healthcare, housing, education, and ancestral lands all form part of a dignified life. 
 77 As noted earlier, the Human Rights Committee’s work was previously criticized because “the 
focus of periodic reviews and communications related to article 6 [was] on state action that interferes 
with the right to life rather than state inaction in the face of systemic deprivations of the right.” ESCR-
Net, Recognizing the Interdependence and Indivisibility of the Right to Life with ESC Rights: Written 
Submissions for the General Discussion on the Preparation for a General Comment on Article 6 (Right 
to Life) (June 12, 2015), 
https://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/Discuss
ion/2015/ESCR_Net_SRAC_GI.doc&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1. 
 78 It is important to point out that language was ultimately removed from the draft General Comment 
that may have restricted individual petitions before the Human Rights Committee (or national courts 
interpreting the provision). The deleted text provided: “Individuals claiming to be victims of a violation 
of the Covenant [for the purposes of article 1 of Optional Protocols] must show, however, that their rights 
were directly violated by acts or omissions attributable to the States [P]arties [to the Optional Protocol], 
or are under are under a real and personalized risk of being violated.” A11 Initiative for Economic and 
Social Rights, Advocating for the Amendment of Paragraph 15 of the Human Rights Committee Draft 
General Comment 36, http://www.a11initiative.org/en/advocating-for-the-amendment-of-paragraph-15-
of-the-human-rights-committee-draft-general-comment-36/ (last visited Nov 20, 2019). 
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recognizes the interdependent relationship between social and civil rights.79 
While rare with the right to life, the European Court has more frequently 
protected socio-economic norms under the rights to humane treatment and 
private life.80 
II. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
A. Overview 
The Inter-American Court has protected and promoted social, 
economic, and cultural rights by distinct means.81 First, the Tribunal has 
recognized such rights as essential elements of the American Convention’s 
Article 4, right to life.82 Second, it has recently introduced a bold 
interpretation of the Convention’s Article 26, “Progressive Development,” 
to find independent violations of several social rights.83 Third, the Court has 
used Article 21, right to property, to safeguard not only indigenous lands and 
resources, but also their cultural identity.84 Fourth, it previously utilized due 
 
 79 See Liam Thornton, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Socio-Economic Rights 
Charter?, in IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 60 YEARS AND BEYOND, 
supra note 67, at 227–56; Luke Clements and Alan Simmons, European Court of Human Rights: 
Sympathetic Unease, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW,  supra note 37, at 409–27. 
 80 Violations to the European Convention’s Article 3 (Prohibition of Torture) often occur under 
circumstances of serious deprivation, such as unacceptable detention conditions. See HARRIS, O’BOYLE 
& WARBRICK, supra note 34, at 261. See also Larioshina v. Russia, App. No. 56869/00, Judgement, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2002), ¶ 3 (“[T]he Court considers that a complaint about a wholly insufficient amount of 
pension and the other social benefits may, in principle, raise an issue under Article 3 of the Convention.”). 
In cases involving the destruction of homes and destitute living conditions, the Court has found violations 
to Article 8 (Right to Respect for Private and Family Life). See generally Dulas v. Turkey, App. No. 
25801/94, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Moldovan and Others v. Romania, App. Nos. 41138/98 and 
64320/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005). 
 81 See generally JAMES L. CAVALLARO, CLARET VARGAS, CLARA SANDOVAL, BERNARD DUHAIME, 
CAROLINE BETTINGER-LÓPEZ, STEPHANIE ERIN BREWER, DIANA GUZMÁN, AND CECILIA NADDEO, 
DOCTRINE, PRACTICE AND ADVOCACY IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (2019); Tara Melish, The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING 
TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at 372–408; Mónica Feria-Tinta, 
Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of Protection of 
Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions, 29 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 431, 431–459 (2007). 
 82 See infra Sections B and C; Steven R. Keener & Javier Vasquez, A Life Worth Living: Enforcement 
of the Right to Health through the Right to Life in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 40 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 595 (2009); Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): The 
Integration of Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 83 See infra Section D. 
 84 See, e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 341(2) (June 27, 2012) (finding “the violation of the rights to 
consultation, to indigenous communal property, and to cultural identity, in the terms of Article 21 of the 
American Convention”); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
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process and procedural guarantees to protect the rights to a pension and 
social security.85 Finally, the Court has ordered expansive socio-cultural 
reparations, including housing, health, agricultural, cultural, and educational 
programs.86 This section focuses on the Court’s influential right-to-life 
approach, with additional discussion of its new and disputed method of 
interpreting Article 26. 
B. The Right to Vida Digna 
The Court’s right to vida digna, often translated as the right to a 
“dignified existence,” or to a “dignified” or “decent” life, is primarily 
grounded in the Convention’s Article 4.87 The Tribunal introduced this right 
in 1999, through its pioneering judgment Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala; 
it has further refined the right in subsequent decisions.88 
Villagrán Morales involved the murder of five teenagers by 
Guatemalan national police. At the time, there was a brutal crackdown 
against “street children” who were perceived to threaten public safety.89 The 
Court held that the “fundamental” right to life also includes the “right that [a 
human being] will not be prevented from having access to the conditions that 
guarantee a dignified existence.”90 The Court also asserted that States should 
 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 95 (Nov. 28, 2007) (linking Article 21 to the 
many rights associated with an indigenous community’s ability “to freely determine and enjoy [its] own 
social, cultural and economic development.”). 
 85 See Melish, supra note 81, at 398. Furthermore, while the American Convention does not mention 
unions expressly—unlike the Protocol of San Salvador, the ICCPR, and the European Convention—the 
Court has established the right to form trade unions through the Convention’s Article 16, Freedom of 
Association. Huilca Tecse v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 121, ¶ 70 (Mar. 3, 2005). 
 86 For example, the Court has required restitution and clean-up of ancestral lands, and extensive 
community development initiatives, including educational, housing, agricultural and health projects. See, 
e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 293–95; 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 201; Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. 
Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 116, ¶¶ 106–08 (Nov. 19, 2004) 
(mandating broad medical, psychological and vocational programs); Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. 
Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 112, ¶¶ 318–321 (Sept. 2, 2004); Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 250, ¶ 285 (Sept. 4, 2012) (ordering 
an initiative “for the rescue, promotion, dissemination and conservation of the ancestral customs and 
practices” of the Maya Achí people). 
 87 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (providing that “[e]very person has the right to have his life 
respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”). But see Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 190 (finding a breach of both Article 4 and Article 5). 
 88 See Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 191. 
 89 Id. ¶ 79. 
 90 Id. ¶ 144. 
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provide “at-risk children” with the “minimum conditions for a dignified 
life,” because “every child has the right to harbor a project of life that should 
be tended and encouraged by the public authorities” so that both the child 
and society may benefit.91 
In this way, the Court expanded positive State obligations to protect 
life, when the “security and integrity” of youth are under threat.92 Later, 
Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia condemned the “climate of violence and 
insecurity” endured by children in the aftermath of a savage attack on their 
community.93 Threats, homelessness, separation from family, and poverty all 
ensued—depriving the youth of the “right to a decent life.”94 As a result, the 
Court found that the rights to life of surviving children, as well as two youth 
killed in the massacre, were violated.95 For similar reasons, the Court found 
that displaced adult survivors also suffered a violation of the “right to a 
decent life.”96 
Gonzales Lluy v. Ecuador concerned a child, Talía Gonzales Lluy, who 
was mistakenly given a transfusion with HIV-infected blood.97 The Inter-
American Commission argued that Talía’s right to a dignified life, among 
other rights, had been violated by the State’s failure both to regulate the Red 
Cross blood bank and to ensure Talía’s medical treatment once her family 
filed a criminal complaint.98 Talía survived the ordeal, and ultimately the 
Court found that the State violated her rights to life and to personal integrity, 
“owing to the violation of the obligation to monitor and supervise the 
provision of health care services.”99 The Court did not specifically find a 
breach of Talía’s right to a dignified life, although the judgment recognized 
 
 91 Id. ¶ 191. See also Juridical Condition & Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-
17/2002, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 137(7) (Aug. 28, 2002) (stressing for children “the [State] 
obligation to provide the measures required for life to develop under decent conditions.”). 
 92 See generally Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 24 (Trindade, 
A.A.C., concurring). 
 93 ”Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 134, ¶ 162 (Sept. 15, 2005). 
 94 Id. ¶¶ 161–62. 
 95 Id. ¶ 163. 
 96 Id. ¶ 186. 
 97 See generally Gonzales Lluy v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 298 (Sept. 1, 2015). 
 98 Id. ¶ 1. The Inter-American Commission, among other responsibilities, refers cases to the Court; 
while its role has been reduced since 2009, it must appear in all cases before the Tribunal. See generally 
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 57, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
 99 Gonzales Lluy v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 298, ¶ 191. 
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that her family was forced to go to great lengths “to ensure Talía’s survival” 
and to provide “a decent life for her.”100 
Juvenile Reeducation Institute involved thousands of detained 
teenagers and young adults who faced appalling living conditions.101 The 
Court held that States have the duty to ensure that all incarcerated persons, 
both children and adults, can still enjoy a vida digna.102 Detention facilities 
must allow for “opportunities for exercise or recreation,” education, and 
“prompt and proper medical, dental and psychological care.”103 However, the 
detainees in Juvenile Reeducation Institute were overcrowded, lacked 
medical attention and educational programs, and endured riots and deadly 
fires. Consequently, the Court found Paraguay in breach of both Articles 4 
and 5 (right to personal integrity) with respect to all detainees at the facility 
over a five-year period—amounting to over three thousand individuals.104 
In Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala, the Court also linked the rights 
to life and personal integrity when assessing detention conditions.105 María 
Inés Chinchilla Sandoval, an adult, suffered from serious health problems; 
however, she received inadequate medical attention while incarcerated and 
eventually died in prison. The Court affirmed that the rights to life and 
personal integrity are “directly and immediately linked” to health care.106 
Further, the Court emphasized that detained persons cannot, on their own, 
obtain “a series of basic necessities essential for the development of a 
dignified life.”107 The State must ensure that detention conditions are 
 
 100 Id. ¶ 216, 290 (noting that “the situation of poverty also had an impact on the difficulties to gain 
access to the education system” and on the victim’s ability to overcome her “numerous factors of 
vulnerability and risk.”). 
 101 Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 4. 
 102 For example, the judgment stated “the Court must establish whether the State, in fulfillment of its 
role of guarantor, took measures to ensure to all inmates at the Center—adults and children alike—the 
right to live with dignity and thus help them build their life plan, even while incarcerated.” Id. ¶ 164. The 
Court requires additional protections for detained children. Id. ¶ 176. 
 103 Id. ¶ 166. 
 104 The Court found additional Article 4 violations in the cases of individuals who had died in 
detention for various reasons attributed to the State; additional Article 5 violations were declared in the 
cases of victims who had been injured while in detention for causes attributed to Paraguay. Id. ¶ 190. 
 105 Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 312 (Feb. 29, 2016): See also Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23, ¶ 114 (Nov. 15, 2017) (joining the right to life, in particular vida 
digna, with the right to personal integrity); Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 112, ¶¶ 170–71. 
 106 Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 312, ¶ 170. 
 107 Id. ¶ 168. See also Mendoza v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, and Reparations, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 260, ¶ 188 (May 14, 2013); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
on the Human Rights of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, OEA/ Ser. L/V/II Doc. 64, ¶ 49 
(Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/pdl/docs/pdf/PPL2011eng.pdf. 
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“compatible with personal dignity.”108 Specifically, it must safeguard the 
physical and mental health of incarcerated persons, through “regular medical 
checkups, and when required, medical treatment that is adequate, timely and, 
if applicable, specialized and appropriate to [their] special necessities.”109 
The Court ultimately concluded that Guatemala violated Articles 4 and 5 
with respect to Ms. Chinchilla Sandoval. 
In Yakye Axa Community v. Paraguay, the Court first applied its 
concept of vida digna to indigenous populations.110 The Yakye Axa 
community suffered twelve years of delays while it attempted to reclaim 
traditional lands through administrative procedures. In the meantime, the 
community lived in a temporary settlement adjacent to their ancestral 
territories; however, they were unable to practice their traditional subsistence 
activities.111 The housing, sanitation, and health conditions were gravely 
deficient.112 
The Court stressed that a State holds the “duty to take positive, concrete 
measures geared toward fulfillment of the right to a decent life, especially in 
the case of persons who are vulnerable and at risk, whose care becomes a 
high priority.”113 Further, it considered elements of a dignified life in this 
context: 
Special detriment to the right to health, and closely tied to this, 
detriment to the right to food and access to clean water, have a major 
impact on the right to a decent existence and basic conditions to 
exercise other human rights, such as the right to education or the 
right to cultural identity.114 
In view of the community’s abysmal living conditions and fruitless efforts 
by Paraguay to alleviate them, the Court found the State responsible for a 
violation of the right to vida digna and Article 4 of the Convention.115 
Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community involved another displaced 
indigenous community in Paraguay.116 The petitioners, a nomadic people, 
 
 108 Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 312, ¶ 169. 
 109 Id. ¶ 171. Subsequently, the Court offers additional, detailed instructions on medical care. See id. 
¶¶ 171–225. 
 110 Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 2, (June 17, 2005). 
 111 Id. ¶ 164. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. ¶ 162. 
 114 Id. ¶ 167 
 115 Id. ¶ 176. 
 116 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 2, (Aug. 24, 2010). Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 
also concerned an indigenous community that sought to reclaim its lands while suffering harrowing living 
conditions. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
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claimed over 40 square miles of the Paraguayan Chaco.117 Under a heading 
titled “The Right to a Dignified Existence,” the judgment assessed, in more 
detail than usual, the following aspects of the community’s situation: “access 
to and quality of water,” “diet,” “health,” and “education.”118 
As for water access, the Court noted that the water occasionally 
supplied by local authorities was far less than the minimum of 7.5 liters per 
day per person required by international standards.119 Regarding nutrition, 
local ranches had restricted the community’s farming and hunting. Although 
the State delivered shipments of food, the Court found these deliveries to be 
too infrequent.120 The judgment took note of evidence demonstrating 
alarming levels of malnourishment among community members.121 
As for health care, the State sent personnel to provide medical treatment 
and medicine on several occasions. Nevertheless, the Court considered the 
medical care to be “temporary and transitory.”122 It also observed that 
hospitals and clinics were located far away, “basic medications” were not 
available on site, and Paraguay needed to implement services that respected 
the community’s traditions and customs.123 With respect to education for the 
Xákmok Kásek, the Court affirmed that States must “guarantee accessibility 
and sustainability to free basic education,” and emphasized the use of 
culturally-appropriate methods “in the heart of indigenous communities.”124 
The judgment found that the community’s school lacked sufficient 
resources, and did not offer appropriate shelter from the elements.125 
After its assessment, the Court concluded that Paraguay did not furnish 
“the basic services to protect the right to a decent life of a specific group of 
individuals in these conditions of special, real and immediate risk.” 126 As a 
result, like in Yakye Axa, Article 4 was breached with respect to “all the 
 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146., ¶ 208. In Sawhoyamaxa, the Court held the State responsible for 
nineteen deaths; however, unaccountably, Sawhoyamaxa did not appear to find a violation of the 
community’s right to vida digna. 
 117 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 68. 
 118 Id. ¶¶ 193–213. 
 119 Id. ¶ 195 (citing documents from the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights and the World Health Organization). Little information was available about the water’s 
quality. 
 120 Id. ¶ 200. Based on the information provided to the Court, it concluded that the State supplied 
“approximately 0.29 kg per person per day” of food from 2009 to 2010, but the judgment does not explain 
precisely how the Court determined that amount was insufficient. Id. 
 121 Id. ¶ 201. 
 122 Id. ¶ 208. 
 123 Id. ¶¶ 207–08. 
 124 Id. ¶ 211. 
 125 Id. ¶ 213. 
 126 Id. ¶¶ 217. 
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members” of the Xákmok Kásek Community.127 Further, the Court found an 
additional Article 4 violation for thirteen deaths, which were traced to the 
precarious health conditions.128 The State did not adopt the necessary 
measures “within its powers, that could reasonably be expected to prevent or 
to avoid the risk to the right to life.”129 
At the end of 2017, the Court returned to the topic of dignified life with 
its Advisory Opinion 23, which analyzed State obligations for protecting the 
environment under the American Convention.130 As for the right to vida 
digna, the advisory opinion primarily focused on the situation of indigenous 
and tribal populations, and how States must adopt positive measures to 
ensure their “access to a dignified life—which includes the protection of 
their close relationship with the land—and to their life project, in both its 
individual and collective dimension.”131 The Court underlined the 
importance of “access to, and the quality of, water, food and health” for a 
dignified life, explaining that these components are also key for the exercise 
of other rights.132 It stressed that the protection of the environment is a 
“condition” for a dignified life; in this way, pollution and development 
projects can jeopardize vida digna.133 
Advisory Opinion 23 was the Court’s last major statement on the right 
to a dignified life to date. In some ways, it simply reaffirmed how an 
indigenous community’s vida digna depends on a robust relationship with 
its ancestral lands and natural resources. Yet there were signs that the Court 
may have restricted its concept of dignified life. It appears that Advisory 
Opinion 23 placed more of an emphasis on “access” to vida digna134 than 
 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. ¶ 234. 
 129 Id. ¶ 234. 
 130 The Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the 
Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity: Interpretation and 
Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) in Relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23. 
 131 Id. ¶ 48. 
 132 Id. ¶ 109. 
 133 Id. ¶¶ 109, 117. See also Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 309, ¶¶ 172, 181 (Nov. 25, 2015) (“[T]he Court has emphasized 
the importance of the protection, conservation and improvement of the environment contained in Article 
11 of the [Protocol of San Salvador] as an essential human right related to the right to a dignified life 
derived from Article 4 of the Convention in light of the existing international corpus iuris on the special 
protection required by members of indigenous communities . . . the State must have adequate mechanisms 
to implement these criteria as a means of guaranteeing the right to a dignified life and to cultural identity 
to the indigenous and tribal peoples in relation to the protection of the natural resources that are in their 
traditional territories.”). 
 134 Advisory Opinion 23, supra note 105, ¶¶ 48, 109, 114, 117. 
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before.135 A positive right to a dignified life, as opposed to a mere ability to 
access such conditions, places far greater obligations on States. Further, 
unlike Xákmok Kásek, there was no allusion to education as a part of vida 
digna. Still, the Court did not claim to provide an exhaustive list of vida 
digna’s elements, and the opinion was intended to focus on environmental 
topics.136 
C. Synthesis of the Vida Digna Approach 
As of this writing, the Court has indicated that water, nutrition, health 
care, housing, education, and ancestral lands all form part of a dignified 
life.137 Most cases discussed above involved indigenous peoples, detainees, 
or marginalized children.138 The situations often consisted of brutal State 
actions, such as in Villagrán Morales, or glaring omissions, like in Xákmok 
Kásek Indigenous Community. Nevertheless, a close textual analysis shows 
that those three specific groups are not required to “activate” vida digna 
obligations. Also unnecessary is a particularly shocking form of official 
action or omission. Rather, with this jurisprudence, the Court has developed 
an expansive State duty “to take positive, concrete measures” to protect 
individuals or communities who find themselves in “conditions of special, 
real and immediate risk” to a broad right to life.139 If the authorities know or 
should know that persons are in such a situation, they must take reasonable 
 
 135 It is true that Villagran Morales described a “right that [a human being] will not be prevented 
from having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence.” Villagrán Morales v. 
Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 144. But “access” is mentioned less as the Court’s 
jurisprudence develops. See, e.g., Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 309, ¶  172 
(affirming an unqualified right to a dignified life); Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 217 (same); Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, ¶ 162 (“[T]he State did not create the conditions and did 
not take the necessary steps for the boys and girls of the instant case to have and develop a decent life.”). 
 136 See Advisory Opinion 23, supra note 105, ¶¶ 117, 109 (explaining that the requisites for a 
dignified life are water and adequate food, among others). 
 137 The aspect of housing is less explicitly discussed in the case law, but it finds strong support in 
Mapiripán Massacre and Yakye Axa. See Mapiripán Massacre Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, ¶¶ 
161–62 (considering that many families were displaced from their homes and had to build shacks of tin 
and plastic, before declaring a vida digna violation); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 50.94, 164 (finding, as an element of a vida digna violation, that community members 
lacked access “to appropriate housing with the basic minimum services.”). 
 138 Yet in Mapiripán Massacre, as described above, the Court took a somewhat different approach 
when it declared a vida digna violation with respect to internally-displaced adults (along with children), 
who had not been identified as indigenous peoples in the judgment. Mapiripán Massacre, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, ¶¶ 186, 189. 
 139 Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 162; Xákmok 
Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 217. Similarly, 
Yakye Axa asserts that States “must inescapably . . . generat[e] minimum living conditions that are 
compatible with the dignity of the human person.” Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 125, ¶ 162. 
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measures to protect them, or the State will violate, at a minimum, the right 
to vida digna.140 
Thus, the State obligations are more extensive than what many assume. 
The cases concerned traditionally-vulnerable individuals and communities, 
but indicate that States can be held liable for failing to ensure the right to 
dignified life of any person. The Court has yet to define its standards for 
“special, real and immediate risk.” But it should be noted that the Court does 
not require or perform personalized risk assessments in certain group cases, 
where it has found violations of the right to vida digna with respect to 
hundreds of indigenous community members, or even thousands of youth at 
the Paraguayan detention center.141 It is enough to show that the group, as a 
whole, faces threats to a dignified life. Further, in addition to the individual 
and collective reparations ordered in these judgments, the Court will often 
require structural remedies, such as legislative reform, reaching far beyond 
the victims of the case.142 
However, the vida digna approach may have already reached its high 
watermark. In Advisory Opinion 23, the Court noted that only in “exceptional 
circumstances” may the right to life be found violated when a victim has not 
died.143 Lately, it does seem exceptional that the Court will declare a vida 
digna violation, or even devote significant attention to the concept.144 In very 
recent cases, even when the Inter-American Commission or victims’ 
attorneys claim a breach of the right to a dignified life, the Court has avoided 
much discussion of the issue.145 The main reason for this shift is explained in 
the next section. 
 
 140 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 188 (“In 
order for this positive obligation to be applicable, it must be established that at the moment the facts 
occurred, the authorities knew or should have known of the existence of a situation of real and immediate 
risk to the life of an individual or a particular group of individuals and that the authorities did not take the 
measures necessary within the scope of their duties that, reasonably speaking, one could expect to include 
preventing or avoiding those risks.”). 
 141 See Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 176 
(“These violations were committed to the detriment of all inmates at the Institute in the period from 
August 14, 1996 to July 25, 2001.”). 
 142 See, e.g., Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, 
¶ 337 (ordering these various measures); Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 340 (ordering all such measures). 
 143 Advisory Opinion 23, supra note 105, ¶ 109 (translation by author). 
 144 But see Muelle Flores v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 375, ¶¶ 197, 233 (Mar. 6, 2019) (stating that “retirement pensions, and in 
general social security, constitute a means of protection to enjoy a dignified life,” and ordering Peru to 
provide the victim a pension to secure him the “basic conditions of dignified life”) (translation by author). 
 145 See, e.g., Cuscul Pivaral v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 359 (Aug. 23, 2018) (discussed in text immediately below); 
Duque v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
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D. Article 26: A New Approach to Social Rights 
The Court’s declining emphasis on vida digna is illustrated by the 
recent judgment Cuscul Pivaral v. Guatemala.146 In Cuscul Pivaral, 
numerous petitioners argued that their right to vida digna was violated 
because Guatemala failed to adopt measures to ensure their adequate medical 
care. Yet the Court did not consider the links between life, personal integrity, 
and health, as it did two years earlier in Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala.147 
Rather, the judgment held that because the facts constituted a violation of the 
right to health under the American Convention’s Article 26, it was 
unnecessary to examine the right to life.148 
The American Convention does not expressly establish the right to 
health.149 Beyond the Convention’s Preamble, its Article 26 contains the 
main reference to social, economic, and cultural rights: 
The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and 
through international cooperation, especially those of an economic 
and technical nature, with a view to achieving progressively, by 
legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the 
rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and 
cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of 
American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires.150 
In 2017, the Court—for the very first time—found a violation of Article 26 
in Lagos del Campo v. Peru.151 Since then, it has declared Article 26 
violations in five more judgments, including Cuscul Pivaral, rapidly creating 
an entirely new line of jurisprudence on social rights.152 
 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 310 (Feb. 26, 2016); Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 245. 
 146 Cuscul Pivaral v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 359. 
 147 Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 312. 
 148 Id. ¶ 160. 
 149 American Convention, supra note 36. 
 150 Id. art. 26. 
 151 Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 340 (Aug. 31, 2017). 
 152 See Muelle Flores v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 375 (violation of the right to social 
security); Cuscul Pivaral v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 359 (violation of the right to 
health); Poblete Vilches v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 349 (Mar. 8, 2018) (violations of the rights to health and to “obtain informed consent and access to 
information as relates to health”) (translation by author); San Miguel Sosa v. Venezuela, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 348 (Feb. 8, 2018) (violation of the 
right to work); Dismissed Employees of Petroperú v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 344 (Nov. 23, 2017) (violation of the right to work); 
Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 340 (violation of the right to “job stability”) 
(translation by author). 
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In these recent decisions, the Court variously held that the rights to 
social security, health,153 work, and “job stability” are all protected by Article 
26; in Advisory Opinion 23, it stated that the Article also safeguarded the 
right to “a healthy environment.”154 The Court made these determinations by 
concluding that the rights are “implicit” in the Organization of American 
States (OAS) Charter’s “economic, social, educational, scientific, and 
cultural standards.”155 For many years, the Court has considered that the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man “contains and 
defines” the rights of the OAS Charter.156 Consequently, it also has taken the 
Declaration’s provisions into account when deciding whether these social 
rights are protected by the Charter, and thus, by Article 26.157 
This pivotal, and surprising, development has attracted its share of 
controversy, and a few current judges continue to object to the approach. 
Some of the primary objections are outlined in this section, although a full 
discussion of the debate falls out of this Article’s scope. A first objection 
involves the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, also known as 
the “Protocol of San Salvador.”158 Sixteen States have ratified or acceded to 
the Protocol of San Salvador, which entered into force in November of 
1999.159 
The Protocol establishes the right to work, “just, equitable, and 
satisfactory conditions of work,” trade union rights, right to social security, 
right to health, right to “a healthy environment,” right to food, right to 
education, right to “the benefits of culture,” right to “the formation and the 
 
 153 Poblete Vilches also established the right to “obtain informed consent and access to information 
as relates to health.” Poblete Vilches v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 349, ¶ 267(5) (translation 
by author). 
 154 Advisory Opinion 23, supra note 105, ¶ 57. See also Maria L. Banda, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on the Environment and Human Rights, ASIL INSIGHTS Vol. 22, Issue 
6 (May 10, 2018) (“The recognition of an independent right to a healthy environment (justiciable under 
Article 26) could open the door to new categories of claims in the Inter-American system”). 
 155 American Convention, supra note 36, art. 26. 
 156 Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework 
of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, 1989 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 43 (July 14, 1989). 
 157 However, note that the American Declaration does not mention all of these rights. Also, the Court 
purports to use other methods of interpretation as well, such as considering Article 29 of the American 
Convention and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
 158 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 156 (Nov. 16, 
1999). 
 159 A:52: Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador” General Information of the Treaty, 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-52.html [hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador] (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2019). 
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protection of families,” rights of children, and protections for the elderly and 
disabled.160 However, the treaty grants jurisdiction to the Inter-American 
Commission and Court only over petitions that allege violations of Articles 
8 and/or 13, which protect the rights to unions and education, respectively.161 
Thus, critics of the Court’s new Article 26 approach argue that the States of 
the region created a specialized treaty for social rights that should not be 
disregarded—and in particular, this regional consensus provides the Court 
only very limited jurisdiction over these rights.162 
Second, Article 26’s “progressive” obligations caused the Court to 
hesitate for years on the question of justiciability. Could individual petitions 
prove a violation of such obligations, and thus be adjudicated by the Court? 
It took two decades for the Tribunal to acknowledge only that a State’s 
“progressive implementation” or regression with respect to social rights 
“may be subjected to accountability” under Article 26—without explaining 
how.163 With recent changes to the Court’s roster of judges, however, this 
issue suddenly became much less of an obstacle.164 
A third concern, among others, involves the broad language of Article 
26. If the Court adjudicates the provision in individual cases, this grants it 
wide discretion to define rights “implicit in” the OAS Charter’s “economic, 
social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards.”165 In fact, a review of 
these numerous Charter “standards”—which in many instances refer to 
amorphous principles and objectives of public policy—confirms that the 
Court’s discretion has become expansive indeed.166 
 
 160 Id. arts. 6–18. 
 161 Id. art. 19(6). 
 162 See, e.g., Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 340 (partially dissenting 
opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto); Oswaldo Ruíz-Chiriboga, The American Convention 
and the Protocol of San Salvador: Two Intertwined Treaties, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 159, 185–186 
(2013) (criticizing the Court for paying insufficient attention to the Protocol). 
 163 Acevedo Buendía (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the Comptroller”) v. Peru, Preliminary 
Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 198 ¶¶ 102–03 
(July 1, 2009). 
 164 See Caso Poblete Vilches v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 349 ¶ 104 (interpreting 
“immediate” state obligations in Article 26) (translation by author). 
 165 See Christian Courtis, El Artículo 26, in LA CONVENCIÓN AMERICANA COMENTADA (2014) (in 
which Christian Courtis considers that the following Articles of the OAS Charter lead to social, economic 
and cultural rights: Articles 2, 3, 30, 31, 34, 39, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, and 52. Courtis has argued that, at 
a minimum, these rights include various cultural and consumer rights, as well as rights to education, work, 
social security, housing, food, and health). 
 166 Charter of the Organization of American States art. 34, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. (providing 
for: equality of opportunity; equitable distribution of wealth and income; increase of per capita national 
product; adequate and equitable systems of taxation; reforms leading to equitable and efficient land-tenure 
systems, increased agricultural productivity, expanded use of land, diversification of production and 
improved processing and marketing systems for agricultural products; accelerated and diversified 
industrialization; stability of domestic price levels; fair wages, employment opportunities, and acceptable 
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In this way, despite the typical objections sketched here, the Court has 
introduced a second novel approach to social rights, after vida digna. In only 
two years, it has already shown enthusiasm for identifying these rights under 
Article 26 and finding States responsible for violations. The latest judgments, 
such as Cuscul, suggest that the Tribunal’s current majority prefers to assess 
social rights independently, rather than link them to the right to life under a 
vida digna approach. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO A DIGNIFIED LIFE: 
SUPRAPOSITIVE, CONSENSUAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
A. Overview 
This section will assess the Inter-American Court’s vida digna 
approach through Gerald Neuman’s useful analytical framework. According 
to Neuman, human rights have suprapositive, consensual, and institutional 
aspects.167 Rights interpretation “draws on all three of these aspects in a 
manner that makes the convention system justifiable, politically acceptable, 
and effective.”168 To begin, suprapositive norms consist in “principles that 
have normative force independent of their embodiment in law, or even 
superior to the positive legal system.”169 These principles emanate from 
natural law, religion, ethics, and cultural values, among others; human rights 
treaty provisions often attempt to reflect these “preexisting” norms.170 
The consensual aspect in international law, of course, refers to the 
agreement of States. Their consensual actions include not only the creation 
and ratification of treaties, but also subsequent acts “of express or implicit 
consensual revision.”171 Finally, the institutional element considers realities 
and limitations encountered when interpreting a right in a certain way. The 
institutional aspect does not necessarily provide a “third source of 
 
working conditions for all; rapid eradication of illiteracy and expansion of educational opportunities for 
all; extension and application of modern medical science; proper nutrition; adequate housing; urban 
conditions that offer the opportunity for a healthful, productive, and full life; promotion of private 
initiative and investment in harmony with action in the public sector; and expansion and diversification 
of exports—all of which are referred to as “goals”). 
 167 Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 101, 111 (2008) [hereinafter Neuman 1]; Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights 
and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1866 (2003) [hereinafter 
Neuman 2]. See also Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept 
in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 126–158 (2008) (discussing the “essence,” “consensus,” 
and “obligations” approaches). 
 168 Young, supra note 167, at 123. 
 169 See Neuman 2, supra note 167, at 1868. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Neuman 1, supra note 167, at 111. 
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legitimation” for rights, but rather may represent “practical constraints” on 
rights, which already derive their legitimacy from suprapositive or 
consensual sources.172 In a specific situation, the three elements can converge 
or diverge. For example, a particular interpretation of a right could reflect a 
suprapositive norm convincingly; however, from an institutional perspective 
the interpretation may pose significant complexities for enforcement.173 
B. Suprapositive Aspect 
The Inter-American Court has called for States to safeguard the right to 
a dignified life. Beyond the Court and the Human Rights Committee, several 
domestic courts and international human rights authorities have joined 
dignity to the right to life. In 1981, the Supreme Court of India famously 
held: 
The right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all 
that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as 
adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, 
writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about 
and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings.174 
Judges, human rights experts, and many others have drawn the intuitive 
conclusion that insufficient levels of food, shelter, health care, and other 
needs both imperil survival and deprive human existence of dignity.175 In 
these circumstances, the right to life is emptied of its substance. 
Clearly, the right to vida digna appeals directly to human dignity as its 
suprapositive principle. Human dignity has served as the foundation for the 
international human rights movement, the American and Universal 
Declarations of Human Rights, and the numerous instruments that 
 
 172 See Neuman 2, supra note 167, at 1869. 
 173 Id. at 1872. 
 174 Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, AIR 1981 SC 746 (India). 
 175 See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, supra note 51, ¶ 27 (“The right 
to life cannot be separated from the right to a secure place to live, and the right to a secure place to live 
only has meaning in the context of a right to live in dignity and security, free of violence”); FARMER, 
supra note 29, at 16–17 (explaining how “the absence of social and economic power empties [other] 
rights of their substance”); Ibrahim Sangor Osman and Others v. the Hon. Minister of State for Provincial 
Administration and Internal Security and Others (2011) K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (“[P]eople living 
without the basic necessities of life are deprived of human dignity, freedom and equality”); Government 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others, 2000 (10) BCLR 84 (CC) ¶ 44 (S. 
Afr.) (“A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a 
society based on human dignity, freedom and equality.”); JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: 
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991 3 (1993) (“[N]o society can pride itself on respect for the individual if 
its social and economic structures have the effect of excluding large numbers of people from access to . . . 
necessities of material life.”). 
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followed.176 “The dignity and worth of the human person”177 encompasses 
several religious and philosophical traditions, which has led to the principle’s 
repeated affirmation in the halls of the United Nations and at constitutional 
conventions across the globe.178 
As it is embraced by diverse communities, there are also a number of 
ways to explain and define human dignity.179 The concept, without more, 
does not precisely set the boundaries of the right to life, nor does it specify 
exactly which social, economic, and cultural norms inhere to the right.180 
Dignity could arguably lead to requirements for a prosperous life, or merely 
to demand survival conditions. In most cases, when courts apply human 
dignity to the right to life, they expand the right’s content, perhaps to better 
reflect the suprapositive nature of dignity. Judges have also enlisted human 
dignity to extend other rights or even to create new ones.181 
Below, the section on institutional aspects will consider consequences 
for the right to life when judges and others interpret it in light of human 
dignity. For now, it is sufficient to identify the suprapositive principle that 
forms the basis for the right to vida digna. While varying in meaning, human 
dignity stands as one of the most accepted and powerful principles in law, 
philosophy, and religion.182 
 
 176 See Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
O.A.S. G.A. Res. XXX, Preamble, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82 doc.6 rev.1 (1948) (“All men are 
born free and equal, in dignity and in rights, and, being endowed by nature with reason and conscience, 
they should conduct themselves as brothers one to another.”); G.A. Res 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, at 72 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter 
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in 
the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards 
of life in larger freedom.”). See also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. 
(C326) 396 (“Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.”). 
 177 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 178 See UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013) (several chapters 
exploring historical, theological, philosophical, and judicial aspects of human dignity); Christopher 
McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 656–
663 (2008). 
 179 See McCrudden, supra note 178, at 655. 
 180 In international human rights law, human dignity often serves as a foundational norm (appearing 
in the Preambles of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, for example), but occasionally appears in operational 
provisions as well. See Gerald L. Neuman, Discourses of Dignity, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, 
supra note 178, at 643. To illustrate, in the articles of the American Convention, dignity is referenced 
with respect to the treatment of detained persons, forced labor, and the rights to privacy and honor. See 
American Convention, supra note 36, arts. 5, 6, and 11. 
 181 See McCrudden, supra note 178, at 721. Paolo Carozza suggests caution before expanding rights 
with human dignity, as the result may not reflect “shared experience.” Paolo Carozza, Human Rights, 
Human Dignity, and Human Experience, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 178, at  629. 
 182 See Christopher McCrudden, In Pursuit of Human Dignity: An Introduction to Current Debates, 
in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 178, at 1 (“[H]uman dignity has probably never 
been . . . so deeply embedded in political and legal discourse . . . . The power of the concept of human 
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C. Consensual Aspect 
This section assesses to what extent States Parties to the American 
Convention on Human Rights may have consented to the right to a dignified 
life. To do so, it first considers the Convention’s text, context, and 
negotiating history. Then, the analysis examines additional relevant 
instruments in the Inter-American System, as well as State constitutional law 
and practice—in particular State responses to the Inter-American Court’s 
judgments on vida digna. 
The American Convention’s Article 4(1) establishes: “Every person has 
the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, 
in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life.”183 The rest of the Article’s paragraphs address the death 
penalty.184 The American Convention’s formulation of the right to life mainly 
drew from the ICCPR’s life provision, with only a few exceptions.185 Neither 
the official negotiation record on Article 4, nor the provision itself expressly 
refers to a broader right to a dignified life.186 
The authoritative Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides 
familiar rules of interpretation for treaties.187 The ordinary meaning of Article 
4 may not indicate a concept of vida digna; however, the context and purpose 
of the treaty should also be considered.188 In this way, the Convention’s other 
 
dignity is unquestionable.”); ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH 
OF THE HUMAN PERSON (2013) (discussing how courts around the world interpret dignity); Paolo G. 
Carozza, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 931, 
935 (2008) (affirming dignity’s capacity to “challenge and undermine the legitimacy of a wide array of 
political and economic systems which . . . have wielded power in ways systematically contrary to the 
good of human persons.”); Young, supra note 167, at 133 (Human dignity is “a value that arguably 
represents the reigning ideology of both human rights and liberal constitutionalism.”). 
 183 The American Convention is the only human rights treaty that expressly determines the point 
from which the right to life must be safeguarded. ANTKOWIAK & GONZA, supra note 34, at 57. The 
European Convention establishes a list of possible limitations to life, while the American Convention, the 
ICCPR, and the African Charter take a more flexible approach, prohibiting “arbitrary” deprivations of 
life. Id. at 58. 
 184 See American Convention, supra note 36, art. 4, ¶ 2–6 (referring to capital punishment). 
 185 As noted, the American Convention specifies the point from which the right to life must be 
protected; in addition, during the treaty’s negotiation, State delegates increased limitations on capital 
punishment. See ANTKOWIAK & GONZA, supra note 34, at 59–60. 
 186 Near the end of the conference that adopted the American Convention, however, the United States 
and Brazilian delegations issued a vague resolution that stated, “The United States and Brazil interpret 
the language of paragraph 1 of Article 4 as preserving to State Parties discretion with respect to the content 
of legislation in the light of their own social development, experience and similar factors.” Minutes of the 
Second Plenary Session, Doc. 86, 441, (Nov. 22, 1969), available at 
https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/mandato/Basicos/actas-conferencia-interamericana-Derechos-Humanos-
1969.pdf. 
 187 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31–33, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 188 Id. art. 31. 
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terms and Preamble should be examined, as well as subsequent agreements 
and practice by States Parties, among other aspects.189 
As noted above, the Convention’s Article 26 provides that States must 
“undertake to adopt measures” toward the “full realization of the rights 
implicit” in the provisions of the OAS Charter.190 The OAS Charter’s Article 
34 actually mentions vida digna—although it is translated as “full life”—
where it sets out developmental goals for States, including “[u]rban 
conditions that offer the opportunity for a healthful, productive, and full 
life.”191 The American Convention’s Preamble also supports dignified living 
conditions by declaring “the ideal of free men enjoying freedom from fear 
and want can be achieved only if conditions are created whereby everyone 
may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his civil and 
political rights.”192 
 The San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention, as discussed 
previously, sets out a range of social rights, but has not been fully ratified in 
the region. The Protocol makes two references to vida digna and two to 
“dignified subsistence,” in the context of the rights to work, social security, 
and education.193 The instrument does not directly establish dignified life as 
a right, but rather as an objective to be attained through these other rights. 
The recent Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of 
Older Persons, which entered into force in 2017 and has been ratified by 
seven nations, similarly refers to vida digna in relation to the right to social 
security.194 
 
 189 Id. arts. 31–33. 
 190 American Convention, supra note 36, art. 26. 
 191 Charter of the Organization of American States art. 34, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. The Inter-
American Commission’s original draft proposal for the American Convention contained the standards 
currently found in the OAS Charter’s Article 34; this text was eventually removed in the final version of 
the Convention’s Article 26. See Thomas Antkowiak, Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights: The Inter-
American Court at a Crossroads, in THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, PRESENT AND FUTURE  260–61 (Yves Haeck, Oswaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga & Clara Burbano 
Herrera eds., 2015). See also id. art. 45(a) (“All human beings, without distinction as to race, sex, 
nationality, creed, or social condition, have a right to material well-being and to their spiritual 
development, under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and economic security.”). 
 192 American Convention, supra note 36, Preamble (referring to “the Third Special Inter-American 
Conference [that] approved the incorporation into the Charter of the Organization itself of broader 
standards with respect to economic, social, and educational rights and resolved that an inter-American 
convention on human rights should determine the structure, competence, and procedure of the organs 
responsible for these matters.”). 
 193 Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 159, arts. 6–7, 9, 13. 
 194 Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons art. 17, June 15, 
2015, 55 I.L.M. 985. Among other rights, this Convention also establishes that “[o]lder persons have the 
right to decent and adequate housing and to live in safe, healthy, and accessible environments that can be 
adapted to their preferences and needs.” Id. art. 24. 
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In addition to the regional treaties, the American Declaration on the 
Rights and Duties of Man, which preceded the American Convention, 
certainly merits discussion. While formally non-binding, the Declaration 
stands as a very influential instrument for the Americas.195 The Declaration’s 
Article XI, titled “Right to the preservation of health and to well-being,” 
provides: 
Every person has the right to the preservation of his health through 
sanitary and social measures relating to food, clothing, housing and 
medical care, to the extent permitted by public and community 
resources.196 
Other Declaration articles recognizing the rights to education, work, and 
property seek to “attain a decent life,” a “suitable standard of living,” and the 
“essential needs of decent living,” respectively.197 Finally, the Social Charter 
of the Americas, adopted in 2012, declares in its first article that OAS 
Member States must promote development “with a view to eliminating 
poverty, especially extreme poverty, and achieving a decent standard of 
living for all.”198 
Of course, human rights treaties are special international agreements, 
which attempt to protect individuals and groups, rather than to benefit States 
Parties directly. Both the Inter-American and European human rights 
systems have affirmed that their conventions are “living instruments,” whose 
interpretation “must consider changes over time and present-day 
conditions.”199 Thus, both the Inter-American and European Courts have 
engaged in “evolutive interpretation”200 to ensure that treaty rights stay both 
“contemporary and effective.”201 Over the years, the European Court in 
 
 195 See Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE, THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 393–94 
(Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 
OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶¶ 42–43 (July 14, 1989). As noted earlier, the Declaration 
also influences the interpretation of rights in the OAS Charter. 
 196 Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. 
G.A. Res. XXX, art. XI, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82 doc.6 rev.1 (1948). 
 197 Id. arts. XII, XIV, XXIII, respectively. 
 198 Social Charter of the Americas art. 1, Sept. 20, 2012, AG/doc.5242/12 rev. 2. In 2015, OAS 
Member States approved a Plan of Action for the Social Charter. OAS Adopts Plan of Action of the Social 
Charter of the Americas, SEDINEWS, http://www.oas.org/en/sedi/nl/0215/1_en.asp (last visited Dec. 23, 
2019). 
 199 Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due 
Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, ¶ 114 (Oct. 1, 1999); 
Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 183 (1978). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 10, 1730, 1730 (2011) (“An evolutive interpretation of 
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particular has paid close attention to evolving consensus among States 
Parties—as expressed through national law and practice, as well as standards 
issued by the Council of Europe—before extending and redefining 
Convention rights.202 
Having examined relevant Inter-American human rights instruments, 
national constitutional law should now be considered for a possible 
consensus on vida digna. For many decades, the nations of Central and South 
America have recognized human dignity in their constitutions.203 In these 
texts, dignity often features as one of the central national values and as a 
basis for fundamental rights. Since 1988, Latin America has experienced a 
wave of constitutional creation and reform.204 This period of renewal has led 
to the greater incorporation of economic, social, and cultural rights, as well 
as stronger connections of domestic legal systems to international human 
rights law—including the case law of the Inter-American Court.205 
 
the ECHR is the tool that keeps the meaning of the rights both contemporary and effective.”). Citing this 
“evolution of the fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary international law” and the 
American Convention’s savings clause (Article 29), the Inter-American Court frequently refers to other 
international instruments in order to develop the content of the Convention’s rights. See, e.g., Chitay Nech 
v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 212, ¶ 165 (May 25, 2010) (using the Convention on the Rights of the Child to define contours of 
the American Convention’s Article 19, Rights of the Child); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 172,  ¶ 92 (referring to the ILO Convention No. 169 to assess indigenous rights to 
property). 
 202 See Dzehtsiarou, supra note 201, at 1731 (quoting Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 183); 
Neuman 1, supra note 167, at 102, 107 (also noting that, with respect to importing international principles 
and case law, “the [Inter-American] Court has come to undervalue the consent of the relevant community 
of states as a factor in the interpretation of a human rights treaty.”). More recently, the Inter-American 
Court has taken a greater interest in regional standards and national law. See, e.g., ANTKOWIAK & GONZA, 
supra note 34, at 2, 161–62 (observing greater deference to States and domestic law in the Court’s newer 
judgments); Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 
159–64 (surveying national laws in the Americas on “the right to consultation of indigenous and tribal 
communities.”). 
 203 See McCrudden, supra note 178, at 664. Thirty Constitutions in the Americas currently refer to 
“human dignity” or “dignity,” https://www.constituteproject.org (follow “Explore Constitutions” 
hyperlink; then search for “dignity”; then filter by country and select “Americas, Entire Region”). 
 204 Rodrigo Uprimny, The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin America: Trends 
and Challenges, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1587 (2011). 
 205 See id. at 1589–94; Sergio García Ramírez, The Relationship between Inter-American 
Jurisdiction and States (National Systems): Some Pertinent Questions, 5 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L COMP. L. 
115, 128 (2015) (“Recent decades have seen important constitutional reforms in various American 
nations, with . . . a single goal—the primacy of human rights—and an alliance, for this purpose, between 
international treaties and domestic norms.”); Carlos E. Gallegos Anda, Good Living and Vida Digna: 
Latin American Approaches to Social and Economic Inequality 9, 
https://www.academia.edu/32427106/Good_Living_and_Vida_Digna_Latin_American_Approaches_to
_Social_and_Economic_Inequality. 
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As for vida digna specifically, the constitutions of Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Venezuela all expressly refer to this term.206 Ecuador directly establishes 
a right to vida digna, which “assures” health, nutrition, housing, potable 
water, and “other necessary social services.”207 Several other constitutions of 
the region use comparable phrases: “dignified existence,” “decent 
existence,” or the “good life.”208 While these concepts are usually not framed 
as rights, various texts establish, as a major national objective, that poverty 
or inequality should be addressed to achieve a “dignified existence” for all.209 
An even greater number of constitutions require employment rights and 
benefits in order to ensure “dignified” living conditions.210 Further, 
 
 206 In the Constitutions of Bolivia and Venezuela, the term vida digna is used where demanding 
employment rights and benefits that will ensure a dignified life. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO 
Feb. 7, 2009, art. 70 (Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA Dec. 20, 
1999, art. 100. The San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention takes a similar approach. See 
Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 159, arts. 6, 9. 
 207 CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR Sept. 28, 2008, art. 66(2) (“El derecho a una 
vida digna, que asegure la salud, alimentación y nutrición, agua potable, vivienda, saneamiento ambiental, 
educación, trabajo, empleo, descanso y ocio, cultura física, vestido, seguridad social y otros servicios 
sociales necesarios.”). 
 208 See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 5, 1988, art. 170 (Braz.) (“The 
economic order” is “intended to assure everyone a dignified existence.”); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 
LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ, 1972, art. 64 (State is obliged to “ensure to every workman the necessary 
conditions for a decent existence.”); Constitución Política del Estado Feb. 7, 2009, art. 8 (Bol.) (“The 
State adopts and promotes” principles such as “teko kavi (good life) . . . .”). 
 209 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 5, 1988, arts. 3, 170 (Braz.) (“Fundamental 
objective” of the State is “to eradicate poverty” and substandard living conditions . . . . “The economic 
order, founded on the appreciation of the value of human labor and free enterprise, is intended to assure 
everyone a dignified existence.”); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] Jul. 4, 1991, arts. 2, 334 
(explaining that an “essential” purpose is to promote “general prosperity” and the “improvement of the 
quality of life of the inhabitants.”); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit. 
VI, ch. I, art. 98, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] Jan. 9, 1987, as amended by Ley No. 854, Ley de 
Reforma Parcial a la Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua, L.G. Feb. 10, 2014 (“The 
principal function of the State in the economy is to achieve the sustainable human development in the 
country; to improve the living conditions of the people and to realize a more just distribution of wealth in 
the pursuit of a good life.”); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, Preamble (Bol.) (“A 
State based on respect and equality for all, on principles of sovereignty, dignity, interdependence, 
solidarity, harmony, and equity in the distribution and redistribution of the social wealth, where the search 
for a good life predominates.”); CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR Sept. 28, 2008, 
Preamble (“Decidimos construir una nueva forma de convivencia ciudadana, en diversidad y armonía con 
la naturaleza, para alcanzar el buen vivir, el sumak kawsay.”). 
 210 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA Nov. 7, 1949, art. 57 (referencing a 
“dignified existence” in this context); CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA Feb. 24, 2019, art. 31 
(“Paid labor must be the principal source of income that sustains dignified living conditions.”); 
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR Dec. 20, 1983, art. 37 (“State shall employ all 
resources that are in its reach to provide employment . . . and to ensure . . . the economic conditions for a 
dignified existence.”); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA, May 31, 1985, art. 
102(a) (“The right to the free choice of work and the satisfactory economic conditions that guarantee a 
dignified existence for the worker and his [or her] family.”); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA 
DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit. IV, ch. V, art. 82, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.]  Jan. 9, 1987, as amended 
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constitutional and high courts in Latin America have strengthened the links 
between life, dignity, and living conditions.211 
Also relevant in assessing regional consent is a review of how States 
have responded to the Inter-American Court’s case law on vida digna. 
Especially over the last decade, the Inter-American Court and the Inter-
American Commission have faced resistance by States due to various legal 
and institutional issues.212 Yet it appears that the Court’s right to vida digna 
has not directly caused conflict or backlash. 
When debated before the Court,213 defendant States at times have not 
explicitly addressed the right to a dignified life.214 On other occasions, States 
have recognized the importance of dignified living conditions or the right to 
 
by Ley No. 854, Ley de Reforma Parcial a la Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua, L.G. 
Feb. 10, 2014 (“Equal pay for equal work under identical conditions . . . which ensure well-being 
compatible with human dignity”); CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL PARAGUAY Jun. 20, 
1992, art. 92 (“[W]orkers have the right to enjoy a remuneration that assures . . . a free and dignified 
life.”). See also CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ 1972, arts. 64, 122 (setting out 
a stronger formulation of the right of workers and farmers to a “decent existence”). 
 211 See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025, 
(¶ 6.3.2) (Colom.) (stating that the right to vida digna, among others, of the case’s displaced communities 
is under threat because of their difficult living conditions); Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional 
Court] mayo 10, 2010, Sentencia 0108/2010-R, numero de archivo 2006-14391-29-RAC (Bol.) (finding 
that the rights to life and health were violated when HIV medication was not consistently provided to a 
child); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CS]N] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 01/06/2000, 
“Association Benghalensis,” A. 186. XXXIV (Arg.) (holding that the State is obligated to care for HIV 
patients, under the premise that the right to life includes the right to health); Flavia Piovesan, Brazil: 
Impact and Challenges of Social Rights in the Courts, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING 
TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMFPARATIVE LAW, supra note  37, at 182, 185 (describing several 
rulings from the Brazilian Supreme Court that established that “the right to health derives from the right 
to life, thereby recognizing a right to medicine among the underprivileged” and sick). 
 212 See, e.g., Jorge Contesse, Resisting the Inter-American Human Rights System, 44 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 179 (2019); Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons From The Inter-American Court’s 
Struggle To Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2011); Press Release, Colom. Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Comunicado de prensa del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores sobre el Sistema 
Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (Apr. 24, 2019), available at 
https://id.presidencia.gov.co/Paginas/prensa/2019/190424-Comunicado-de-prensa-del-Ministerio-de-
Relaciones-Exteriores-sobre-el-Sistema-Interamericano-de-Derechos-Humanos.aspx (requesting, in 
part, that the Inter-American System’s reparations be more “proportionate” and respect the “realities” of 
the States). See also infra Part III(D)(2) (discussing development projects on indigenous lands); Ximena 
Soley and Silvia Steininger, Parting Ways or Lashing Back? Withdrawals, Backlash and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 14 INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT 237 (2018); René Urueña, Double or 
Nothing? The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in an Increasingly Adverse Context, 35 WIS. INT’L 
L.J. 398 (2018). 
 213 This research takes into account the summaries of arguments provided by the Court in its 
judgments. 
 214 See, e.g., Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63; Mapiripán 
Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134. 
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vida digna; however, they disputed a violation in the specific situation.215 In 
the notable case Gonzales Lluy v. Ecuador, during a public hearing the State 
accepted responsibility for certain facts, and “offered” to the victim “a decent 
life [vida digna], health, education, a public apology” and “decent 
housing . . . to ensure [her] right to life.”216 
Although States cannot appeal Court judgments, they can request an 
interpretation of the decision.217 Occasionally, States attempt to challenge 
judgments by this means.218 As of this writing, there have been no 
interpretation judgments on the right to vida digna.219 In contrast, after the 
Lagos del Campo decision, Peru promptly asked the Court why it assessed a 
right to “job stability” in the case, and argued that the Article 26 violation 
was not justified.220 
On the other hand, States have not always complied promptly with 
socio-cultural reparations in the Court’s judgments on vida digna.221 It is true 
that Villagrán Morales’ limited remedies in this area were completed.222 But 
 
 215 See, e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, 
¶ 235 (“[T]he State reiterated that it cannot be claimed that the impact of the oil company’s activities has 
caused serious harm to the conditions required for a decent life for the Sarayaku.”); Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 147(c) (“Within the limitations of 
a relatively less developed country . . . the State has created the conditions necessary to guarantee a decent 
life for these indigenous populations, providing periodical food and sanitary assistance . . . .”). 
 216 Gonzales Lluy v. Ecuador,  Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 298, ¶ 45. In another relevant case, 
Ortiz Hernández v. Venezuela, the State declared that it would take various measures to “ensure 
conditions of dignified life to the victim and family members, attending fully to their duly determined 
socio-economic needs.” Ortiz Hernández v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 338, ¶ 219 (Aug. 22, 2017) (translation by author). 
 217 See American Convention, supra note 36, art. 67 (“The judgment of the Court shall be final and 
not subject to appeal. In case of disagreement as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall 
interpret it at the request of any of the parties, provided the request is made within ninety days from the 
date of notification of the judgment.”). 
 218 The Court has emphasized that interpretation requests “should not be used as a means of 
contesting” or modifying the judgment. See, e.g., Abrill Alosilla v. Peru, Interpretation of the Judgment 
on Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 235, ¶ 10 (Nov. 21, 2011); Fernández 
Ortega v. Mexico, Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 224, ¶ 11 (May 15, 2011). 
 219 See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Interpretation of the Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 142 (Feb. 6, 2006) (refraining from discussing 
the right to vida digna). 
 220 Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 366, ¶ 13 (Nov. 21, 2018). 
 221      For official information regarding State compliance, see Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/busqueda_supervision_cumplimiento.cfm?lang=en. 
 222 Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, 
2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Having Seen,” ¶¶ 3–4 (Jan. 27, 2009) (finding Guatemala complied with 
monetary reparations, as well as orders to reform legislation, to assist with a victim’s burial, and to 
“designate an educational center with a name allusive to the young victims in this case and place, in this 
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the Court’s sweeping orders to provide medical and psychological treatment 
to numerous victims in Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay and 
Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia223 have not yet been fulfilled, nor have 
Juvenile Reeducation Institute’s vocational training programs.224 
As for the indigenous community cases against Paraguay, the Court 
required, among other measures, the return of traditional territories, 
community development funds, and “the provision of basic goods and 
services necessary for the subsistence of community members.”225 According 
to official Court documents, Paraguay has not yet completed all of these 
reparations; however, the Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek communities 
have returned to their lands, and authorities have provided potable water, 
food, and medical attention.226 In these cases, it is difficult to conclude that 
compliance delays prove a principled opposition to the right to a dignified 
life.227 In general, States often take significant time to fulfill Court 
reparations, especially if they require substantial financial resources, 
political will, or technical expertise.228 
 
center, a plaque with [their] names”; however, it has not adequately investigated and punished the 
responsible parties); 12 Guatemalan Cases, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, 
2015 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 24, 2015). 
 223 Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, 
2012 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Declares,” ¶ 5 (Nov. 23, 2012) (Among other measures, Colombia also has 
not completed orders to build a memorial for the massacre or to ensure that the displaced villagers can 
safely return); Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order 
of the Court, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Declares,” ¶ 2 (Nov. 19, 2009); Press Release, Inter-American 
Court, Corte Interamericana realiza visita al Paraguay para supervisar cumplimiento de sentencias, CP-
46/17 (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/comunicados/cp_46_17.pdf (indicating that the 
Court was formally inquiring into the medical/psychological and vocational reparations, among others, 
during its visit to Paraguay). 
 224 Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Order of the Court, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 
“Declares,” ¶ 2. 
 225 The Cases of the Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Communities v. 
Paraguay, Monitoring Compliance with Judgments, Order of the Court, 2017 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 
“Resolves,” ¶ 3 (Aug. 30, 2017). 
 226 See Press Release, Inter-American Court, Corte Interamericana realiza visita al Paraguay para 
supervisar cumplimiento de sentencias, CP-46/17  (Dec. 7, 2017), 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/comunicados/cp_46_17.pdf., (“The Yakye Axa community continues 
living in a reduced space on the side of the road . . . and not in the lands that must be delivered to them. 
The Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek communities are living on their traditional lands, which still have 
not been titled.”) (translation by author); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Order of the 
Court, 2019 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Resolves,” ¶ 2–4 (indicating progress and delays with reparations); 
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Order of the Court, 2008 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Declares” 
(Feb. 8, 2008) (same). 
 227 It should be noted that none of these compliance orders made reference to or discussed vida digna. 
 228 See Thomas M. Antkowiak, An Emerging Mandate for International Courts: Victim-Centered 
Remedies and Restorative Justice, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 279 (2011); Caroline Bettinger-López, The 
Challenge of Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Law in the Cotton Field Case, 15 
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In sum, it appears very unlikely that, at the time of its adoption, the 
American Convention contained extensive positive obligations to ensure a 
dignified life. Yet a regional commitment has been increasingly articulated 
to secure dignified living conditions for the inhabitants of the Americas. The 
emergence of a right to a dignified life, especially through the Inter-
American Court’s case law, has pushed this commitment to become more 
concrete and justiciable. Latin American States have apparently not opposed 
this conceptual evolution, and they also did not object when the Human 
Rights Committee recently endorsed “the right to life with dignity.”229 
Certainly, however, significant effort will be required to further develop and 
implement this right in the national law and practice of the region. 
D. Institutional Aspects 
1. Challenges with courts adjudicating social rights in general 
This section considers various institutional issues encountered when 
courts adjudicate social rights in general, and when the Inter-American Court 
specifically applies human dignity to the right to life. One of the major, 
longstanding objections to social rights concerns the role of judges in their 
interpretation and enforcement.230 By adjudicating these rights, courts 
become more involved in determining socio-economic policies and 
allocating limited governmental resources.231 
Granting an unaccountable body too much authority in this arena could 
“empt[y] the democratic process of its necessary content, preventing . . . vital 
 
CUNY L. REV. 315, 317–18 (2012); CARLOS M. BERISTAIN, DIÁLOGOS SOBRE LA REPARACIÓN: 
EXPERIENCIAS EN EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, VOL. II  531 (2008). 
 229 The only Latin American State to submit observations on the Human Rights Committee’s draft 
general comment was Brazil, in order to condemn the use of nuclear weapons. See U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights—Right to life, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GC36-
Article6Righttolife.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
 230 See, e.g., ARYEH NEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY 81 
(2012) (explaining that the “main criticism” of social rights is that efforts to address inequality and 
poverty “should focus on the political process” and “democratic decision-making” and not on the courts). 
Other objections to social rights include that they are too expensive, too vague, encourage laziness, 
penalize the creation of wealth, undermine economic growth, and grant too much power to the State. See 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra note 19, ¶ 65; Bernard Duhaime, Le Système 
Interaméricain et la Protection des Droits Économiques, Sociaux et Culturels des Personnes et des 
Groupes Vivant dans des Conditions Particulières de Vulnérabilité, 44 CAN. Y.B. INT’L LAW 95, 131–
35 (2006) (reviewing several of these objections and considering whether they are fair or justified). 
 231 See, e.g., WICKS, supra note 68, at 222 (“[T]he judiciary may regard itself as not best placed to 
make decisions about allocating resources.”); Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive 
Duties and Positive Rights, PUB. L. 498, 512 (2006) (“Positive duties are often thought to be better suited 
to the political than the judicial arena, because decision-makers are accountable to the electorate for their 
decisions as to how to balance competing claims on resources.”). 
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debates about the minimum substance of social and economic protection.”232 
In some nations, judicial intervention has been ambitious and could create 
unexpected imbalances and financial burdens.233 For example, if a court 
orders a sizable community development fund whose amount is 
disproportionate to local realities, this could create financial strain that will 
hinder the State’s ability to assist similar communities, as well as to protect 
social rights in general. 
Similarly, critics argue that courts lack the technical capacity and 
expertise to define and enforce social rights.234 Some judges themselves have 
shown reluctance “to perform the roles required to promote the deeper 
understanding of economic and social rights and their implementation by 
diverse governmental agencies.”235 In fact, the South African Constitutional 
Court stated that it was “not institutionally equipped to make the wide-
ranging factual and political inquiries necessary for determining the 
minimum-core standards [for a right to health care], nor for deciding how 
public revenues should most effectively be spent.”236 
A different concern involves the position of judges in society. If judges 
enjoy elite socio-economic status, can they be trusted to endanger their own 
privileges to increase protections for the poor and marginalized?237 
Especially in this context, public interest litigation can potentially result in 
judgments that narrow rights and “impede rather than facilitate 
transformation.”238 
 
 232 Young, supra note 167, at 160. 
 233 Alexandra Huneeus observes that high courts in several nations have ordered “significant reform 
of how government provides particular services,” but notes that it is uncertain “under what circumstances 
such rulings are effective in altering the distribution of material and symbolic goods in a society.” 
Alexandra Huneeus, Reforming the State from Afar: Structural Reform Litigation at the Human Rights 
Courts, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2015).  See also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: 
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 310 (1990) (discussing unintended effects of judicial 
decisions). 
 234 See, e.g., David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 189, 194 
(2012); Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 13 (2003); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 223 
(2001). 
 235 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra note 19, ¶ 36. 
 236 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, Case No. CCT 8/02, Judgment, ¶ 27 (Const. 
Ct. July 5, 2002). 
 237 It is acknowledged that wealthy elites are in the legislatures as well as the courts. Furthermore, 
of course, not all judges are either elite or unelected. 
 238 SANDRA LIEBENBERG, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: ADJUDICATION UNDER A TRANSFORMATIVE 
CONSTITUTION 77–78 (2010). See also Neuman 2, supra note 167, at 1893 (“Constitutionalizing the rights 
and giving a small legal elite final power to interpret them may obstruct rather than facilitate that 
debate.”); Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra note 19, ¶ 65 (explaining that “the 
biggest challenge by far is essentially ideological  . . . [t]he economic and political power of entrenched 
elites is best protected by policies that marginalize ESC rights.”). 
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Many of these challenges are compounded when supranational courts 
adjudicate social, economic, and cultural rights. Inter-American Court 
judges, for example, are unaccountable to the region’s populace; only one 
sitting judge, at maximum, can be nominated by any specific nation’s 
government.239  International judges, often affluent, may not be deeply 
familiar (or sympathetic) with the specific socio-economic difficulties and 
capabilities of the States that come before them. Further, supranational courts 
have less access to evidence and fact-finding mechanisms than their national 
counterparts.240 It is not surprising, then, that several States resisted the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which provides for an individual petition 
system.241 David Marcus noted that “even robust welfare states with active 
judiciaries balk[ed] at the prospect of analogous international 
adjudication.”242 
Still other institutional complications may arise with the supranational 
litigation of social rights, such as possible conflicts among peer tribunals. In 
the Council of Europe, both the European Court and the European Social 
Committee could potentially examine these rights. As for the United Nations 
System, numerous authorities in addition to the Human Rights Committee 
could interpret and monitor social rights, with the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights serving as the primary treaty body.243 Concerns 
about overreaching likely have contributed to cautious approaches from the 
European Court, and even the Human Rights Committee before 2018.244 
Nevertheless, numerous constitutions across the globe—including in 
the Americas—have established social rights as justiciable.245 Increasingly, 
 
 239 See American Convention, supra note 36, art. 52(2) (“No two judges may be nationals of the 
same state.”). 
 240 See, e.g., Nancy Amoury Combs, From Prosecutorial to Reparatory: A Valuable Post-Conflict 
Change of Focus, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 219, 234–39 (2015) (explaining fact-finding difficulties for 
international criminal tribunals); James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional 
Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 768, 803–08 (2008) (describing fact-finding limitations for the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights). 
 241 See David Marcus, The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights through Supranational 
Adjudication, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 65–66 (2006) (citing the objections of Argentina, Italy, Germany, 
and India). 
 242 Id. at 65. 
 243 Numerous United Nations treaty bodies, Special Procedures, and other authorities could 
potentially analyze social rights. For a helpful presentation of these many human rights mechanisms, see 
generally Jane Connors, United Nations, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 369–410 (Daniel 
Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah & Sandesh Sivakumaran eds., 2018). 
 244 These approaches are discussed in Part I(C), supra. 
 245 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra note 19, ¶ 33; SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 234, at 221 (“A remarkable feature of international opinion—indeed a near consensus—is that 
socioeconomic rights deserve constitutional protection.”). 
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national courts have shown themselves capable of interpreting and 
developing these rights.246 As constitutional provisions are translated into 
statutes and regulations, States must require further training and education 
for their judges in this complex, multi-disciplinary field. Although it may be 
preferable for solutions to be pursued through various non-judicial means, if 
such means prove ineffective, a court must ultimately be available to remedy 
violations of rights established by law. 
As for controversies surrounding the supranational adjudication of 
social rights, at least in the Inter-American System States have not rejected 
the Court’s right to a dignified life, despite the challenges involved.247 As 
mentioned above, several nations have also expressly granted the Court and 
the Inter-American Commission, through the San Salvador Protocol, 
jurisdiction over individual petitions alleging violations of the rights to 
unions and education.248 Further, potential conflicts are less of an issue in the 
Americas, which rely only on the Commission and the Court in this domain. 
As the “sole judicial organ” of the American Convention, the Court has the 
authority to review the Commission’s decisions concerning this treaty.249 
2. Challenges with courts adjudicating the right to a dignified life 
specifically 
Certainly, there are risks associated with the litigation of socio-
economic rights. Not only could a hostile or untrained judge distort their 
content, but court procedures themselves may also substantially alter the 
rights and their corresponding obligations. The varied limits of justiciability, 
 
 246 See, e.g., Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks, Introduction: The Elements of Legalization and the 
Triangular Shape of Social and Economic Rights, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 6 (Varun Gauri & Daniel 
M. Brinks eds., 2008) (observing that, “under the right conditions,” courts have advanced social and 
economic rights); Malcolm Langford, The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory, in 
SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 37, at 3 (“In a significant number of jurisdictions, adjudicatory bodies have intervened to 
protect a wide range of social rights”); Katharine G. Young, Introduction, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 1–33 (Katharine G. Young ed., 2019) (presenting global trends of a “juridical 
revolution” in economic and social rights). 
 247 Yet the region may be less receptive to the Court’s aggressive position on Article 26, initiated by 
Lagos del Campo v. Peru. 
 248 In the Inter-American System, the Inter-American Commission also has jurisdiction over the 
social, economic, and cultural rights established in the American Declaration. See, e.g., Hul’qumi’num 
Treaty Group v. Canada, Case 12.734, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 105/09, OEA/Ser.L/V/II., 
doc. 51, corr. ¶ 4 (2009) (concluding that the petition is admissible with regard to alleged violations of, 
among others, Article XIII (Right to the benefits of culture) of the American Declaration); Mitchell v. 
Canada, Case 12.435, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 61/08, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.134, doc. 5 rev. ¶¶ 
67–83  (2008) (assessing an alleged violation of the American Declaration’s Article XIII). 
 249 See e.g., 19 Merchants v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 93, ¶ 27 (June 12, 2002); Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, ¶ 29 (June 26, 1987). 
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remedies, standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine 
all can restrict the full expression of rights.250 
Hallowed principles of human dignity and life, however one defines 
them, are no different. As soon as they are interpreted by courts, they can be 
diminished, or perhaps made too powerful. Commentators have warned that 
codifying or co-opting dignity in law can deprive it of alternative, or fuller, 
meanings.251 
When the right to life transforms into the right to a dignified life, as in 
the Inter-American System, select socio-economic rights are assimilated into 
life. Such a significant shift leads to immediate questions, confusion, and 
likely unintended consequences. First, what is the precise content of this 
metaright, and how can courts draw a line? As in the case of certain domestic 
tribunals, the Inter-American Court has identified specific social, economic 
and cultural elements that it believes are intrinsic to the right to life. As 
reviewed above, these elements currently consist of water, nutrition, health, 
housing, education, and ancestral lands (in the case of indigenous peoples). 
When the State “has not provided the basic assistance necessary” to fulfill 
these needs, the Court has found a violation of the right to a dignified life.252 
Yet several would find fault with this attempt to identify basic 
requirements for a dignified life.253 If the Inter-American Court sets the bar 
low and merely supports survival—however that is understood—it neglects 
dignity’s potential to seek human prosperity. Under a basic needs approach, 
many in society will remain vulnerable, in “drastic material inequality,”254 
and perhaps as “passive . . . recipients of predefined services rather than as 
agents involved in interpreting their needs and shaping their life 
conditions.”255 Of course, there is also disagreement as to which human needs 
should be considered essential under this approach, and how minimal levels 
should be determined. For similar reasons, the United Nations Committee on 
 
 250 See Young, supra note 167, at 161; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability 
and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 685–86 (2006). 
 251 See Tina Beattie, A Theological Reflection on Revelation, Law, and Human Dignity, in 
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 178, at 271 (by “co-opting” dignity, the law “drains it of 
any alternative meaning.”). 
 252 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 217. 
 253 For an excellent critique of a minimum core approach, see generally Young, supra note 167. 
Amartya Sen has explained that even the requirements of survival remain ambiguous: “There is difficulty 
in drawing a line somewhere, and the so-called ‘minimum nutritional requirements’ have an inherent 
arbitrariness that goes well beyond variations between groups and regions.” AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY 
AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION 12 (1981). 
 254 MOYN, supra note 9, at 213 (“[T]here turns out to be no contradiction between drastic material 
inequality and fulfillment of basic provision.”). 
 255 Young, supra note 167, at 132 (citing NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE 
AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 174 (1989)). 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has encountered resistance to its 
concept of a State’s “minimum core obligation,” which seeks to establish 
“minimum essential levels” of food, health care, housing, and education.256 
Second, there are worries that the right to life can actually be debilitated 
by the vida digna judicial interpretation. If the right to life expands to include 
a bundle of social, economic, and cultural elements, a court will likely find 
the right violated more frequently. This could result in “norm dilution,” 
weakening the meaning of the right to life.257 If copious new elements are 
absorbed by life, the right’s content may also become unwieldy and 
unrecognizable.258 Further, it is recalled that social rights need only be 
achieved by States progressively, and can be limited in emergency 
situations.259 If courts integrate social rights into life, could this compromise 
the right to life’s non-derogable and immediately-enforceable 
characteristics? 
Third, savvy litigants and judges take calculated advantage of the force 
and elusive content of human dignity and dignified life. These principles are 
used as a trump card, in order to call attention to a case, jump the queue to 
justice, and defeat other claims and arguments.260 At the very least, dignity 
 
 256 U.N. CESCR, 5th Sess., General Comment 3 ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) 
(hereinafter General Comment 3). For more on how the Committee on Economic and Social Rights 
establishes State responsibility for violations of these rights, see Diane A. Desierto and Colin E. 
Gillespie, A Modern Integrated Paradigm for International Responsibility Arising from Violations of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. OF INT’L AND COMP. LAW 556–595 (2014). 
 257 Tara J. Melish, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity, in SOCIAL 
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 
37, at 372, 407 (discussing a “threat of serious norm dilution” in reference to Article 4 of the Convention); 
Tara J. Melish, Rethinking the “Less As More” Thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights in the Americas, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 171, 326 (2006) (similar). See also 
Cismas, supra note 8, at 472 (also concerned with dilution of rights); Kichwa Indigenous People of 
Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 235 (“The State considered that, within the 
system of guarantees established in the Convention, the right to life has priority and, therefore, the cases 
in which the State can be declared responsible for the violation of this right for having failed to respond 
with due diligence are very exceptional.”). 
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18:1 (2020) A “Dignified Life” and The Resurgence Of Social Rights 
45 
will often be employed to reinforce the reasoning for a range of rights 
violations.261 In this context, some scholars urge courts to assess and balance 
discrete rights only, rather than amorphous concepts that envelop “moral and 
legal propositions whose substance originates elsewhere.”262 Otherwise, an 
arms race can ensue, with one version of dignity pitted against another.263 
Like the right to life, the concept of dignity faces the danger of being pulled 
in multiple directions until it rips apart. 
Fourth, even some social rights advocates would disapprove of the 
Inter-American Court’s right to a dignified life. Subsuming social rights 
under a classic civil right may suggest inferiority. If social rights are only 
useful because they enable or support civil and political rights, this indicates 
that they are subordinate to their more accepted counterparts.264 Does this 
approach simply reaffirm the traditional hierarchies in the international 
human rights movement? 
Assessing social, economic and cultural rights on their own merits, not 
dependent upon the right to life, offers another advantage. Disaggregating 
these various rights from vida digna facilitates their individualized 
development.265 They are important rights and they deserve intricate 
elaboration. Major effort, and constant input from victims, stakeholders, and 
experts from various disciplines, are demanded for judges to further refine 
the contours of these rights. 
Finally, potential State resistance to these concepts, and possible 
damage to the Inter-American human rights institutions, should be further 
 
L. Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethinking Supranational Litigation of Economic and 
Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 272 (2004). 
 261 See Jean-Paul Costa, Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 178, at 400 (explaining the approach of the 
European Court “to use the concept of human dignity to reinforce the reasoning leading to a violation of 
the Convention” or to reject complaints incompatible with human dignity). 
 262 Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 577 (1982) (referring to the 
concept of equality). See also Conor Gearty, Socio-Economic Rights, Basic Needs, and Human Dignity: 
A Perspective from Law’s Front Line, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 178, at 169 
(arguing for the analysis and balancing of specific rights). 
 263 Dignity has been established as an operative right, as opposed to a foundational principle, in the 
domestic law of select countries. In these nations, such as Germany and Israel, more specific 
interpretations often have emerged. 
 264 See WALDRON, supra note 175, at 10–11 (explaining that this argument concedes priority to civil 
and political rights). 
 265 See Tara J. Melish, Rethinking the “Less As More” Thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights in the Americas, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 171, 328 (“[S]upranational 
litigation of economic, social, and cultural rights [should seek to preserve] the distinct identity and 
dimensionality of each internationally-recognized human right.”); Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 261 (May 21, 
2013) (concurring opinion of Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, ¶ 57) (arguing for the 
independent development of the right to health, apart from the right to life). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
46 
examined. In these tumultuous times, both regional and international rights 
mechanisms have confronted backlash.266 While States have not appeared to 
challenge the Court’s evolving right to a dignified life, other pertinent 
developments in the Inter-American System should be considered. 
In 2011, a decision by the Inter-American Commission to issue non-
binding precautionary measures unleashed a torrent of State protest.267 The 
Commission requested that Brazil halt construction on the Belo Monte 
hydroelectric power plant, a major project that endangered indigenous 
communities of the Xingu River Basin.268 As a result of this decision and 
others, a group of States led a “reform” movement that ultimately restricted 
the Commission’s powers.269 
The Commission has continued to issue precautionary measures to 
protect communities who face threats to their lives and health, although the 
process is now slower and more cumbersome.270 The right to a dignified life 
was not expressly invoked in the Belo Monte proceedings or in these more 
recent cases. It certainly could have been, however, and one wonders 
whether States will support this expansive right when it requires them to stop 
resource extraction initiatives and other lucrative development projects.271 
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And, one wonders, would the State dare to defy a binding Court injunction 
in this situation, or only Commission recommendations? Up until now, the 
Court has unsurprisingly shown caution when considering emergency 
petitions in this delicate context.272 Fully committing to vida digna in this 
scenario will put the Court on a collision course with States, a path that risks 
weakening the Court’s institutional stability.273 
3. Institutional advantages to the Court’s vida digna approach 
International courts strive to uphold the principle of effectiveness, 
whereby treaty provisions should be interpreted in a way that allows them to 
be effective.274 One major institutional advantage of the vida digna doctrine 
is that it seeks to render the American Convention’s Article 4 more effective. 
Serious poverty, sickness, and vulnerability in Latin America result in 
millions of deaths and directly undermine the right to life.275 By devising the 
right to a dignified life, the Court finds a way to better protect both the 
endangered individuals and communities who come before it, as well as 
many others across the Americas. 
Rights without remedies, of course, are almost meaningless; a tribunal 
must design a remedy that seeks to directly restore the infringed right.276 
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When the Court expressly tied various socio-cultural elements to life, it 
justified a proportional expansion in reparations, such as housing, water, 
health, cultural, and educational projects. A traditional interpretation of the 
Convention’s civil and political rights would disregard such remedies, which 
have been requested and proven necessary by numerous victims before the 
Court.277 
To illustrate, in a situation like that of the Yakye Axa community, the 
Court could limit itself to finding violations of the rights to collective 
property and due process.278 It then likely would order a return of the 
communal lands and some degree of monetary compensation. However, 
finding a vida digna violation substantiates wider remedies such as medical 
attention, as well as shipments of food and potable water. In such a crisis 
situation, these measures are indispensable to protect the community 
members and safeguard the right to life. 
Violations to the Convention’s Article 26 will also lead to socio-cultural 
remedies. Testing the waters with the right to vida digna likely gave the 
Court confidence to dive deeper into the Lagos line of cases. But, for reasons 
discussed above, the use of Article 26 is more controversial to States than 
the right-to-life approach, and may provoke ire—especially if the Court 
relies on the provision to order extensive reparations. Thus, utilizing the right 
to vida digna over an Article 26 approach seems to offer an institutional 
advantage to the Inter-American Court.279 
As for diluting the right to life’s meaning, these concerns are reasonable 
given the potential scope of vida digna. However, as reviewed above, over 
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the last twenty years the Inter-American Court has issued less than ten 
judgments on the right to a dignified life. Recently, it shows even more 
restraint in considering the principle. As a result, it would appear that worries 
about norm dilution have not been realized. 
Similarly, the content and requirements of vida digna have not 
expanded to unmanageable dimensions. The Court has not extended the right 
beyond the modest parameters outlined in the 2010 judgment Xákmok Kásek 
Indigenous Community.280 Still, there is enough case law to guide States and 
to promote the rights of at-risk individuals and communities in the 
Americas.281 
Of course, litigation approaches of human rights advocates and the 
Inter-American Commission can change. Additional cases on the right to a 
dignified life will inevitably compel the Court to define its standards of risk, 
as well as to further detail minimum levels of food, water, health, shelter, 
and education. But a massive surge in petitions, in theory possible due to 
widespread poverty in Latin America, could present serious risks to the Inter-
American System’s integrity.282 
At that point, institutional considerations would counsel some 
narrowing of the right. The Commission and Court could make it more 
challenging for petitioners not belonging to traditionally-vulnerable groups 
to demonstrate State liability.283 Multiple cases may also be joined, and the 
Court could choose to emphasize structural and non-monetary remedies—
for efficiency, and to save States the significant expense of individual cash 
damages.284 Fortunately, such limitations have not yet occurred; the Court’s 
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current right to a dignified life stands as the authoritative formulation to lead 
the region’s governments. 
Finally, the argument remains that subsuming social rights under the 
right to life reinforces the longstanding hierarchy of rights. Yet this position 
neglects evolving international understandings of life. Contemporary views 
advanced by human rights experts consider life to constitute a social right as 
much as a civil right.285 Taken this way, vida digna is not just a strategy to 
anchor marginalized social rights onto established civil rights, in order to 
legitimize and protect the former. It is a manner of refining the content of a 
critical and complex social right. The Inter-American Court’s interpretation 
underscores that the evolving right to life integrally belongs to both spheres 
of rights and in fact connects the two worlds. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Twenty years ago, the Inter-American Court introduced the right to a 
dignified life to international human rights law. This expansive view of the 
right to life was recently affirmed by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee. The Court has established that water, nutrition, health care, 
housing, education, and ancestral lands all form part of a dignified life, and 
has developed a broad State duty “to take positive, concrete measures” to 
protect individuals and communities at risk. By taking a stand on vida digna, 
the Inter-American Court recognized that life could not be meaningfully 
separated from several social, cultural, and economic rights. In order to fully 
protect the fundamental right to life, then, the Court needed to discern its 
broad nature, as well as order proportionate, multi-faceted measures to 
safeguard this right when threatened. 
While any doctrine to protect human rights will suffer weaknesses, the 
right to vida digna has proven overall to be a sensible approach for the Inter-
American Human Rights System, as it has reasonably balanced consensual, 
suprapositive, and institutional factors. The right appeals to the powerful 
suprapositive principle of human dignity, and, as applied by the Court, has 
until now managed several institutional concerns capably. Although States 
did not expressly agree to a right to a dignified life at the American 
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Convention’s adoption, the concept has acquired meaning and force over the 
years. Latin American States have not opposed its crystallization, likely 
because it reflects their emphasis, at least in principle, on human dignity and 
respectable living conditions. 
A dynamic process of exchange among Inter-American Court judges, 
victims of human rights abuse, governments, and experts will allow the right 
to continue to evolve in a manner that respects the integrity of life, the values 
of the region, and the consent of States. If the Court stays committed to this 
process, it will steadily progress toward more protective and specific 
requirements for a dignified life. The vida digna approach can also inspire 
complementary methods to advance social rights and individually develop 
their content—although the Court’s recent Article 26 approach, in particular, 
may not adequately balance consensual, suprapositive, and institutional 
elements. 
As for the other regional human rights systems, the European Court, 
rather than utilizing the right to life, has more often protected socio-
economic norms under the rights to humane treatment and private life. The 
African Court has directly applied the various social, economic, and cultural 
rights enumerated by the African Charter. These varied approaches certainly 
are understandable, as these Courts interpret different treaties and represent 
constituencies with distinct histories, traditions, cultures, and legal systems. 
In any case, as legal institutions increasingly engage creative methods to 
safeguard human dignity, they should closely contemplate the strong 
affirmation by the Inter-American System, and now the Human Rights 
Committee, of the indivisibility of rights and the fullness of life. 
 
